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Reforming California's Homicide Law
Charles L. Hobson*
"[T]he law of homicide is in need of revision."' Justice Mosk is right.
California's homicide law centers around archaic statutes that since
their enactment have undergone little meaningful change. The legislative
and judicial attempts to deal with this are piecemeal at best, frequently
creating more problems than they solve. Comprehensive legislative
reform can correct the errors of the past and limit future errors from
further confusing homicide law.
This Article will point out the problems with California's homicide
law and suggest reforms.2 Part I examines the defects in California's
homicide law. Part II suggests an analytical framework for reforming
criminal statutes.4 Part Ill applies this framework and suggests statuto-
ry reforms for California's homicide law.'
I. THE NEED FOR REFORM
A. The Problem with Malice
The problems with California's homicide law begin with the term
"malice." California defines murder as "the unlawful killing of a human
* Attorney, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation; J.D. 1987, University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law; AB. 1984, University of California, Berkeley.
1. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 584 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., concurring).
2. This Article will not discuss the death penalty. Given the overwhelming public
support for the death penalty, any reform of homicide law should not endeavor to
reduce capital punishment if it is to have a chance of public acceptance. See, e.g.,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE'STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1993, 200-
01 (1994) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1993]. Furthermore,
the death penalty and the structure of homicide law are two different topics. Any
discussion of capital punishment is best left for another time.
In addition, this Article will not discuss the doctrine of justification. There are
serious problems with California's law of justification, particularly with self-defense.
Justification is a topic worthy of its own article, however, and time and space con-
siderations prevent this Article from giving justification the attention it deserves.
3. See infra notes 6-206 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 207-33 and accompanying text.
5. See iNfra notes 234-481 and accompanying text.
being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought."6 The problem with the
definition is that the current definition of malice aforethought has gone
far beyond both its common sense and original legal meaning. The re-
sulting conflicts resonate throughout homicide law, warping an entire
body of law.
1. Artificial Term
Under early English law, liability for homicide was not predicated
upon the defendant's mental state.7 Malice grew out of the common
law's efforts to attach the idea of mens rea to criminal liability.' As the
common law began to treat homicides differently, it developed the con-
cept of malice aforethought to distinguish the excusable from the felo-
nious homicides.' At this time, malice meant no more than a general
criminal intent, as opposed to a killing committed by accident or in
some other pardonable way."0 In this sense, malice was at least related
to a general sense of ill will by the defendant. By the 17th century, mal-
ice was understood to be a deliberate intent to kill." As the common-
law concept of murder developed, malice grew further away from any
notion of ill will.'2 By Blackstone's time, malice had reached its mod-
em form, completely divorced from any common sense notion of ill will
and subdivided into express and implied malice.
Malice aforethought was thus already archaic and divorced from its
original meaning when it was used to define murder in section 19 of the
original Crimes and Punishment Act." Malice has remained in
California's murder law ever since.' This use of malice in murder re-
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988). All future statutory references will be
to California codes unless otherwise noted.
7. RoY MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 14 (1952); see 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 50-54 (3d ed. 1923); 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 468-69 (2d ed. 1968); 3 JAMES STEPHEN, A
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 24 (1883). Others, however, have refused
to concede that early English law ignored the transgressor's mental state. See OLIVER
W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 4 (1881); Percy H. Winfield, The Myth of Absolute
Liability, 42 LAw Q. REV. 37, 40 (1926).
8. MORELAND, supra note 7, at 12.
9. See id. at 10.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 10-12; 3 STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 47-48.
12. MORELAND, supra note 7, at 11. Even after state of mind became an important
consideration, courts inferred motive and malice from the facts. Id.
13. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 199 (Spe-
cial Ed. 1983).
14. 1850 CAL STAT. 231, ch. 99, § 19, 5th Div.
15. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988) ("murder is the unlawful kill-
ing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought") with 4 BLACKSTONE,
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tains its artificial, common-law flavor, rejecting any requirement of ill
will.1
6
California relies on two different meanings of malice derived from the
common law: express malice, which is "a deliberate intention unlawful-
ly to take away the life of a fellow creature," or implied malice, which
is "when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circum-
stances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant
heart."7 This divergence between the legal and common sense defini-
tions of malice is the most obvious problem with California's homicide
law.
Since the law contains a great deal of specialized knowledge, a tech-
nical vocabulary is inevitable. "Estoppel," "proximate cause," and "la-
ches" are examples of terms developed to describe situations unique to
the law. There is little confusion with such terms because they have no
meaning outside the law.
"Malice," however, is more than a legal term of art. Since it is a term
used by society, there is an inevitable risk of confusion when malice is
given its highly artificial definition within the murder statute. The stan-
dard California jury instruction defines murder in the language of Penal
Code section 187, describing the crime as the "unlawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought. " 8 While jurors are given defini-
tions of express and implied malice and are told that malice does not
require ill will,'" the risk of confusion still remains." Jurors are given
many instructions in criminal cases, particularly in murder cases.2' In
supra note 13, at 195 ("Murder is . . . 'when a person of sound memory and discre-
tion, unlawfully killeth any reasonable creature in being and under the kings peace,
with malice aforethought, either express or implied.'").
16. See People v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911, 967 (Cal. 1966) (stating that Penal Code
§ 7, defining malice as a form of ill will, does not supply the definition of the malice
necessary for murder).
17. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988).
18. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL 8.10 (5th ed. 1988) (CALJIC).
19. See id. at 8.11.
20. See People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 363 (Cal. 1966). In Phillips, the California
Supreme Court recognized this risk and disapproved an instruction defining implied
malice "in terms of 'abandoned and malignant heart'" because of the risk that this
would make the jury confuse malice with ill will. Id.
21. A typical California murder trial can include instructions defining the following:
murder (CALJIC 8.10); malice (CALJIC 8.11); deliberate and premeditated murder
(CALJIC 8.20); unpremeditated second-degree murder (CALJIC 8.30); second-degree
murder resulting from an unlawful act dangerous to life (CALIIC 8.31); voluntary
manslaughter (CALJIC 8.40); sudden quarrel or heat of passion (CALJIC 8.42); the
light of the many instructions a jury will receive, an inevitable risk aris-
es that clarifications regarding ill will and malice will be lost in the
mass of instructions.22 Even if the courts are cognizant of the need to
instruct clearly, stating the law correctly will always take priority, mak-
ing jury instructions inherently difficult to understand.23
Given the inherent difficulty of instructing juries, and the overriding
need for courts to tailor their instructions to conform to the law, crimi-
nal statutes should be written in easily understood language. If a crime
is defined in terms lay jurors can understand, it will be much easier for
courts to give juries understandable instructions that conform to the
law.
2. Express Malice
The problem with malice is not limited to the lay public. Courts have
spent many years struggling with the problems caused by California's
common-law definition of murder. Following the common law, Califor-
nia breaks malice into two variants: express and implied.24 California
Penal Code section 188 defines express malice as "when there is mani-
fested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow
creature."2" This definition has only two real problems. First, one could
interpret the phrase "deliberate intent" to mean a mental state greater
than intent to kill. The court dealt with this potential problem in People
v. Saille26 and held that express malice required only intent to kill, ren-
dering the deliberation requirement insignificant.27
cooling period and heat of passion (CALJIC 8.43); no specific emotion alone can
constitute heat of passion (CALJIC 8.44); involuntary manslaughter (CALIIC 8.45); due
caution and circumspection (CALJIC 8.46); distinguishing murder and manslaughter
(CALJIC 8.50); cause of homicide (CALJIC 8.55); negligence of deceased or a third
person (CALJIC 8.56); plus the many other instructions that are required for every
criminal trial.
22. See Frank G. Swain, Common Sense in Jury Trials, 30 CAL. ST. B.J. 405, 412
(1955).
One of the greatest fictions known to the law is that a jury of twelve lay-
men can hear a judge read a set of instructions once, then understand them,
digest them and correctly apply them to the facts in the case. It has taken
the judge and the lawyers years of study to understand the law as stated in
those instructions.
Id.
23. See Robert Winslow, The Instruction Ritual, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 456, 471-73
(1962).
24. Compare 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 199-200 with CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 188 (West 1988).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988).
26. 820 P.2d 588 (Cal. 1991).
27. Id. at 595.
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The second problem is the use of "unlawfully," which the courts have
defined as a lack of mitigation, excuse, or justification.28 Although the
lack of a valid defense is necessary before the state can convict a per-
son of murder, there is no reason to include this truism in the mens rea
for murder. "Unlawfully" does not belong because it at best indirectly
refers to the mental state of the killer. Requiring the absence of any
defense places an unnecessary strain upon the mental element of mur-
der.
Furthermore, this use of "unlawfully" adds another artificial term to
the definition of murder. If the absence of excuse, justification, or miti-
gation makes the killing "unlawful," then the presence of one of these
factors should render the killing "lawful." This assertion is true for
justification and excuse, which are complete defenses to murder.29 It is
not true, however, for mitigation, which simply makes the killing less
unlawful by reducing murder to voluntary manslaughter.3
3. Implied Malice
The statutory definition of implied malice is much more problematic.
Penal Code section 188 defines implied malice as "when no consider-
able provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the
killing show an abandoned and malignant heart."3 The "lack of provo-
cation" language is a restatement of the notion that "[w]hen the killing
is proved to have been committed by the defendant, and nothing fur-
ther is shown, the presumption of law is that it was malicious and an
act of [second-degree] murder."2 Provocation rebutted this presump-
tion.'
The main problem with the "lack of provocation" language is its im-
plicit presumption. Given the United States Supreme Court's strong
hostility to presumptions, particularly where malice is concerned,' any
28. Id.
29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 199 (West 1988).
30. See id. § 192.
31. Id. § 188.
32. People v. Howard, 295 P. 333, 336 (Cal. 1930); accord People v. Lines, 531
P.2d 793, 796-97 (Cal. 1987). One can trace this notion back to the common law,
where once the prosecution proved that the defendant committed the killing, the law
inferred express malice and the defendant had the burden of proving excuse, justifi-
cation, or mitigation. See MORELAND, supra note 7, at 21.
33. See People v. Wells, 76 P.2d 493, 499 (Cal. 1938).
34. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391
definition of a crime that contains a presumption will be viewed with
suspicion. This is particularly true here because the inference is wrong
that all unprovoked homicides are committed with malice.' California
courts attempt to avoid this problem by labeling this presumption a
permissive inference. 6 There is no reason to retain this needless and
potentially dangerous definition.
The "malignant heart" portion of section 188 is little better. This is
another example of archaic language being kept in the murder statutes
long after it has served its purpose." "Abandoned and malignant,"
while indicating some evil purpose, gives no clue as to what purposes
are improper and provides no guidelines for separating improper pur-
poses from simple ill will towards the victim. It is no surprise that the
California Supreme Court has relentlessly criticized the statutory defini-
tion of implied malice.' The California Supreme Court disfavors in-
structions containing "malignant heart," as the term "adds nothing to
the jury's understanding of implied malice; its obscure metaphor invites
confusion and unguided speculation."'
The California Supreme Court responded to this problem by creating
its own definition of implied malice." After a long evolution, implied
malice is now defined as "an intentional act, the natural consequences
of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by
a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and
who acts with conscious disregard for life."4'
(1991).
35. See MORELAND, supra note 7, at 22-23.
36. See People v. Love, 168 Cal. Rptr. 407, 413 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); CALIC 8.11.
37. "Abandoned and malignant heart," like malice, can trace its roots back to the
common law. See MORELAND, supra note 7, at 15; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at
200.
38. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 363 (Cal. 1966).
39. Id.
Hardness of the arteries is an ascertainable concept-but not of the heart;
malignant cancer is similarly ascertainable, but not malignant hearts; also
abandoned children but not abandoned hearts. As sophisticated as human
knowledge has become regarding anatomy of the body, the anatomy of the
crime concept-and especially of malice-has remained as mysterious for
many courts as it was for cavemen. Why not stop abusing the poor heart?
Id. at 363 n.ll (quoting Gerhard Meuller & Patrick Wall, Criminal Law, 1964 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 33, 41 (1964)).
40. See People v. Dellinger, 783 P.2d 200, 201 (Cal. 1989).
41. Id. Before DeUinger, the Court had accepted an alternative definition of im-
plied malice, "when [the] defendant does an act with a high probability that it will
result in death and does it with a base antisocial motive and with a wanton disre-
gard for human life." People v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279, 285 (Cal. 1981). The DeUinger
court disapproved this definition. DeUinger, 783 P.2d at 205.
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Although wordy, nothing is inherently wrong with this definition. The
problem is that it is not the legislature's definition of implied malice.1
2
The definition of implied malice given in People v. Watson and ap-
proved in People v. Dellinger contains no reference to the statutory
terms "no considerable provocation" or "malignant heart."" Instead, it
represents the best effort of the judiciary to determine which uninten-
tional homicides are murders. Although court-created crimes are part of
the common-law tradition,' California law forbids this form of judicial
activism."
This does not mean that the California Supreme Court was necessari-
ly wrong when it substituted its own definition of implied malice for
the statutory one. It recognized that the language of Penal Code section
188 was hopelessly archaic and confusing.4" Something better was
needed, and, in the face of legislative inaction, California's high court
came up with what it saw as the best alternative.47
The fact that the court came up with a serviceable definition of im-
plied malice does not justify legislative inaction. If "conscious disregard
for life" is the best definition of unintentional murder, the legislature
should enact it. Anything less is a dereliction of its duty to define
crimes.
Allowing the California Supreme Court to establish its own definition
of implied malice murder also establishes a dangerous precedent. There
is nothing to prevent the California courts from using the implied mal-
ice experience to rewrite other criminal laws they find objectionable.
Furthermore, no guarantee exists that a court will refrain from chang-
ing its definition of implied malice in the future."8 In order to limit un-
42. See CAL PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988); supra note 31 and accompanying
text.
43. See Watson, 637 P.2d at 285; Dellinger, 783 P.2d at 201.
44. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW, 34-35 (3d ed. 1982).
45. See CAL PENAL CODE § 6 (West 1988); Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617,
625 (Cal. 1970).
46. People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 363 (Cal. 1966).
47. See id.
48. Another example of how easy it is to manipulate malice is the diminished
capacity saga. In a series of cases beginning with People v. Wells, 202 P.2d 53 (Cal.
1949), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 836 (1949), and culminating with People v. Conley, 411
P.2d 911 (Cal. 1966), the California Supreme Court fashioned a diminished capacity
defense that reduced murder to voluntary manslaughter by negating malice. See, e.g.,
People v. Saille, 820 P.2d 588, 591-92 (Cal. 1991) (discussing Conley and Wells). The
problem with the diminished capacity defense was finding a way to justify reducing
controlled judicial experimentation with the law of "murder," the most
serious crime, the California Legislature should provide a clear defini-
tion of malice.
4. Malice and Manslaughter
The problem of malice is not confined to murder. California Penal
Code section 192 defines manslaughter as "the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice."49 This definition, like the definition of
murder, is a holdover from the common law.' Like the law of murder,
the law of manslaughter would be much better off without any mention
of malice.
Manslaughter was not a distinct crime at early common law, but
instead evolved from efforts to punish less culpable, but still wrongful,
homicides with something less than the death penalty. Initially, there
was no difference between the punishment for murder and that for
what would now be called manslaughter; both were felonies and thus
were punished by death." At early common law, however, lesser homi-
murder to voluntary manslaughter because of a defendant's diminished capacity. Be-
cause California Penal Code § 192(a) limits voluntary manslaughter to cases involving
provocation, California's high court needed an alternative. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 192(a) (West 1988). Thus, the court chose to manipulate the definition of malice.
See Conley, 411 P.2d at 918-19. Since manslaughter is defined as an unlawful killing
without malice, diminished capacity simply eliminated malice and thus reduced mur-
der to manslaughter. CAL. PENAL CODE' § 192 (West 1988); People v. Gorshen, 336
P.2d 492, 501-03 (Cal. 1959).
Gorshen did not complete the puzzle, however, because it did not explain how
diminished capacity negated malice. That piece was added by Conley, where the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court created a new standard for malice, i.e., "[an awareness of the
obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society." Conley, 411 P.2d
at 918. This allowed diminished capacity to mitigate an intentional killing to voluntary
manslaughter. Id.
The legislature eliminated the diminished capacity defense, but the problem with
malice remains. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(b) (West 1988). The California Supreme
Court was able to fashion the diminished capacity defense out of thin air because
"malice" is inherently vague and poorly defined. See Conley, 411 P.2d at 918. The
reforms that aborted the diminished capacity defense, however, will not prevent other
manipulations of the definition of malice. See, e.g., In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574,
583 (Cal. 1994) (concluding that the statutory elimination of the diminished capacity
defense did not eliminate the doctrine of imperfect self-defense). Until malice is elim-
inated, the law of murder will be a hostage of the courts.
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995). Section 192 subdivides man-
slaughter into three distinct forms: voluntary, involuntary, and vehicular. Id. § 192 (a)-
(c).
50. See MORELAND, supra note 7, at 9-12, 60.
51. See 3 STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 44.
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cides, those other than murder, were subject to a "general pardon."5 2
One way of avoiding the harsh consequences of the common law was
by claiming the benefit of clergy.' Those who successfully claimed this
benefit were immune from the harsh jurisdiction of the common-law
courts and were tried in the much more lenient ecclesiastical courts run
by the church.' Over time, the law extended this privilege to much of
the general population.5 A reaction against this leniency led to the re-
moval of certain serious offenses from the benefit of clergy.'
Thus, under the common law, whether a crime was subject to the
benefit of clergy determined whether it was punished by the death
penalty.57 Courts classified homicides with malice aforethought as mur-
der and withdrew them from the benefit of clergy.' The remaining un-
lawful homicides, by being allowed the benefit of clergy, were not sub-
ject to capital punishment.59 For this grade of homicides, the common
law created the new term, "manslaughter."' Since malice aforethought
separated capital from noncapital homicide, the common law defined
manslaughter as an unlawful killing without malice aforethought.6 The
distinction between the different types of manslaughter was factual, not
legal, as both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter carried the same
punishment: one year's imprisonment and branding on the thumb.'
Therefore, there was no need to dispense with the general definition of
manslaughter.
52. See id.
53. The benefit of clergy started as a prohibition against secular courts from exer-
cising jurisdiction over clerics. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 365.
54. See PERKINS, supra note 44, at 4.
55. Id. at 4-5; see FREDERIC W. MAITLAND & FRANCIS C. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 72-73 (James F. Colby ed., 1915). The exemptions accorded
clergy were extended to laypersons attached to the church in "minor orders" and
eventually to anyone who appeared to be able to read. Id. The test of literacy used
the same verse of Psalms, so a prisoner only needed to know it by heart to escape
punishment. Id.
56. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 44, at 5.
57. See id. at 4-5.
58. See id. at 5.
59. Id. at 4.
60. See MArrLAND & MONTAGUE, supra note 55, at 72-73; MORELAND, supra note 7,
at 60.
61. See MORELAND, supra note 7, at 9-12, 60.
62. See id. at 60 (citing Francis B. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REV. 975, 996
n.82 (1932)).
There is no reason to continue this archaic treatment of manslaugh-
ter. Voluntary, involuntary, and vehicular manslaughter are distinct
crimes with their own distinct acts, mental elements, and punish-
ments.' There is no reason to classify them all as unlawful homicides
without malice.
Lack of malice is a particularly inappropriate way to define voluntary
manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter is an unlawful, intentional killing
"upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion."' Since intent to kill is ex-
press malice under California law, voluntary manslaughter is actually
committed with malice.'
The California Supreme Court endeavored to surmount this analytical
inconsistency by focusing on the word "unlawful."' The court noted
that express malice is defined as an "intent unlawfully to kill,"67 with
"unlawfully" meaning that "there is no justification, excuse, or mitiga-
tion for the killing recognized by law."' Thus, provocation, a legally
recognized form of mitigation, would negate malice while retaining
intent to kill.' This does not work, however, because section 192 de-
fines manslaughter as the "unlawful killing of a human being without
malice."" "Unlawful" cannot mean a lack of mitigation. Mitigation only
makes something less criminal; it does not absolve a defendant from
responsibility, as does excuse or justification.7' Because a mitigated
crime is still unlawful, lack of mitigation is not a proper component of
unlawfulness." Contrary to California Penal Code section 192, provoca-
tion does not negate malice. While the crime may be reduced to volun-
tary manslaughter, malice still exists.7
This inconsistency does more theoretical than practical harm. While
analytically unsatisfactory, Penal Code section 192 still describes three
valid, distinct crimes.74 Defining manslaughter as the negation of mal-
63. See CAL PENAL CODE §§ 192, 193 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
64. Id. § 192(a); People v. Forbs, 402 P.2d 825, 828 (Cal. 1965).
65. See People v. Saille, 820 P.2d 588, 594 (Cal. 1991).
66. Id. at 595.
67. Id. at 594.
68. Id. at 595 (citing People v. Stress, 252 Cal. Rptr. 913, 918 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988)).
69. See CAL PENAL CODE § 192(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
70. Id. § 192 (emphasis added).
71. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 195 (West 1988) (providing that excuse is a com-
plete defense to homicide) and CAL. PENAL CODE § 197 (West 1988) (providing justifi-
cation is a complete defense to homicide) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(a) (West
1988 & Supp. 1995) and CAL. PENAL CODE § 193(a) (providing that the mitigation
supplied by provocation only lowers the punishment for intentional homicides).
72. See id. § 192.
73. See People v. Saile, 820 P.2d 588, 594 (Cal. 1991).
74. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
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ice also creates greater practical difficulties, however, by giving birth to
the judicial creation of "nonstatutory voluntary manslaughter."75
The term "nonstatutory voluntary manslaughter" had its origins in the
diminished capacity defense, where the term was used to describe the
fact that diminished capacity created a form of voluntary manslaughter
outside the statutory definition of the crime found in Penal Code sec-
tion 192.6 This creation continues today in spirit, if not in form, in the
doctrine of imperfect self-defense. The imperfect self-defense doctrine
has no basis in statutory law and is the ideal example of the problem
with defining manslaughter in terms of an absence of malice.
In People v. lannel,77 the California Supreme Court laid out the im-
perfect self-defense doctrine."8 It held79 that "[a]n honest but unrea-
sonable belief that it is necessary to defend oneself from imminent peril
to life or great bodily injury" reduces murder to voluntary manslaugh-
ter.'
The main problem with imperfect self-defense was that there was no
specific statutory authorization for it, as Penal Code Section 192 only
listed sudden quarrel or heat of passion as factors mitigating murder to
voluntary manslaughter.8 ' Thus imperfect self-defense, like diminished
capacity, created a form of nonstatutory voluntary manslaughter.'
The Flannel court attempted to finesse this problem by borrowing a
page from the diminished capacity defense. The diminished capacity
defense allowed a defendant to reduce murder to manslaughter by
showing that defendant was "incapable of harboring malice afore-
75. See People v. Graham, 455 P.2d 153, 161 (Cal. 1969).
76. Id. at 160. The supreme court subsequently backtracked from this language as
it related to diminished capacity in People v. Mosher, 461 P.2d 659, 662 n.1 (Cal.
1969).
77. 603 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979).
78. Id. at 4.
79. Only three justices signed the lead opinion in Flannel, but the other four jus-
tices did not disagree on the imperfect self-defense issue. See id. at 12 n.1 (Bird,
C.J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 14 (Richardson, J., concurring). The four dis-
agreed with the lead opinion on either the issue of the duty to give sua sponte im-
perfect self-defense instructions in future cases or the need to give diminished capaci-
ty instructions under the facts presented in Flannel. Id. at 14 (Richardson, J., concur-
ring); id. at 11-14 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
80. Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted).
81. Id. at 5; CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
82. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
83. Flannel, 603 P.2d at 6-7.
thought because of a mental disease, defect, or intoxication."' As with
imperfect self-defense, there was no specific statutory authorization for
diminished capacity.' In People v. Conley, the California Supreme
Court skirted this problem by manipulating the definition of malice.'
The Conley court added a new requirement to malice, "an awareness of
the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society,"
which was negated by diminished capacity.8 In Flannel, imperfect self-
defense negated this new, nonstatutory element of malice, allowing
imperfect self-defense to negate malice, and reduce second-degree mur-
der to voluntary manslaughter.'
Flannel and Conley provide ideal examples of what is wrong with
malice. Because malice, as it relates to murder, is so vague and artifi-
cial, the California Supreme Court fashioned diminished capacity and
imperfect self-defense without any legislative authorization.' Malice is
no more than judicial putty, twisted and shaped by the whims of the
judicial branch.
The legislature abolished Conley's "awareness of duty" element along
with the diminished capacity defense in 1981.' Negating this element
of malice, which was central to the imperfect self-defense doctrine,
would seem to eliminate imperfect self-defense. In In re Christian S.,'
the court rejected this result, finding that the legislative reforms of 1981
were not meant to abrogate Flannel since it only specifically eliminated
"diminished capacity, diminished responsibility, and irresistible im-
pulse." ' Since imperfect self-defense was an established concept at the
time of the 1981 reforms, the California Supreme Court stated that the
defense could be abolished only upon a showing of clear legislative
84. People v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911, 916 (Cal. 1966).
85. See CAL PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988, & Supp. 1995).
86. Conley, 411 P.2d at 918-19.
87. Id. at 918.
88. People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Cal. 1979).
89. See Conley, 411 P.2d 911; Flannel, 603 P.2d 1.
90. People v. Saille, 820 P.2d 588, 592-93 (Cal. 1991). In 1981 the legislature enact-
ed and the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 54, which abolished diminished capacity
in Penal Code sections 28 and 29 and specifically eliminated the Conley duty by
amending the definition of malice in Penal Code § 188. Id. at 593; see also CAL. PE-
NAL CODE §§ 28-29, 188 (West 1988). Senate Bill No. 54 also changed the definition
of premeditation and deliberation in Penal Code § 189. Saille, 820 P.2d at 593; see
also CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988). The legislature made subsequent, but minor
changes to the statutes enacted in SB 54. Saille, 820 P.2d at 593 n.5.
91. 872 P.2d 574 (Cal. 1994).
92. Id. at 582.
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intent.' The failure to single out imperfect self-defense made the
Christian S. court determine that there was no intent to overrule F/an-
nel.'4
While the 1981 reforms may not explicitly overrule Flannel, they did
remove statutory pretense for imperfect self-defense. With the Conley
duty to conform to society gone, there is no longer any way for imper-
fect self-defense to rebut malice.
The Christian S. court stated that cases had recognized imperfect
self-defense before the court added the Conley duty to malice." While
this may give Flannel some alternative support, it does not overcome
the fact that imperfect self-defense is not rooted in the Penal Code.
These cases did no more than state that imperfect self-defense reduced
murder to manslaughter, they did not explain how a means not found
in the Penal Code could mitigate murder. Imperfect self-defense re-
mains free of any statutory mooring.
The problem with malice is that it is an archaic, artificial label di-
vorced from any notion of common sense. It has allowed California's
homicide law to evolve into a needless web of artifice and complexity.
Removing malice from homicide law will help untangle this web and
bring some needed consistency. and common sense to the law of ho-
micide.
B. Other Problems
1. Voluntary Intoxication
Malice is not the only problem with California's homicide law. A
related problem is the current state of the voluntary intoxication de-
fense to implied malice murder. In People v. Whitfield,97 the California
Supreme Court allowed voluntary intoxication to be a defense to im-
plied malice. " This allowance resulted from a strained interpretation of
93. Id. at 577.
94. Id. at 578-79.
95. Id. at 578.
96. See People v. Sedeno, 518 P.2d 913, 920-921 (Cal. 1974); People v. Wells, 202
P.2d 53, 62-63 (Cal.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 836 (1949); Roads v. Superior Court, 80
Cal. Rptr. 169, 171 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); People v. Lewis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 263, 269
(Cal. Ct. App. 1960); People v. Best, 57 P.2d 168, 169-70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936).
97. 868 P.2d 272 (Cal. 1994).
98. Id. at 273.
California's homicide law and created a needless loophole suspiciously
similar to the legislatively discredited diminished capacity defense.
Whitfield was a drunk-driving second-degree murder case' in which
the defendant claimed he was so intoxicated that he did not have the
implied malice necessary to support his murder conviction."u Despite
the fact that the defendant's voluntary intoxication helped provide the
basis for the implied malice finding, the Whitfield court held that this
same intoxication could also negate the defendant's implied malice.' '
The Whitfield decision revolved around the issue of whether implied
malice murder was a specific intent crime. °2 The Whitfield court took
two approaches to justify its finding that this was a specific intent
crime. First, the court found that the legislative history of Penal Code
section 22 supported the notion of allowing voluntary intoxication to
negate implied malice.'" Second, it found that designating implied mal-
ice murder a specific intent crime conformed to the policy behind dis-
tinguishing between specific and general intent crimes.' 4 This distinc-
tion was meant to deal with intoxicated offenders by mitigating liability
for certain crimes.' 5 As voluntary intoxication could only reduce im-
plied malice murder to involuntary manslaughter, the Whitfield court
found it appropriate to designate implied malice as a form of specific
intent."
While the Whitfield court engaged in very suspect statutory interpre-
tation in reaching its conclusion, 7 there is no need to engage in any
extensive analysis of Whitfield's reasoning. Since this Article addresses
99. In People v. Watson, the California Supreme Court held that a homicide com-
mitted by a drunk driver could support a second-degree murder conviction under an
implied malice theory. People v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279, 285-86 (Cal. 1981).
100. Whitfield, 868 P.2d at 273.
101. Id. at 280.
102. Id. at 275. "Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue
of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, premedi-
tated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is
charged." CAL. PENAL CODE § 22(b) (West 1988).
103. Whitfield, 868 P.2d at 275-77.
104. Id. at 277-78.
105. Id. at 279.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 275-77. The Whitfield dissent found several serious flaws in the
majority's analysis. Id. at 282-96 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the ma-
jority paid insufficient attention to the language of Penal Code § 22. Id. at 285-86
(Mosk, J., dissenting). The dissent further noted that the majority's reading of the
legislative history of section 22 was incorrect and that historically, voluntary intoxi-
cation did not rebut implied malice murder in California or the rest of the country.
Id. at 286 n.1, 290 (Mosk, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the policy behind
the specific intent rule is best served by classifying voluntary intoxication as a gen-
eral intent crime. Id. at 294-95.
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legislative reform of the law of homicide, Whitfield must stand or fall
as a matter of public policy. As a policy matter, Whitfield is fundamen-
tally unsound and deserves to be overruled by legislation.
The decisive problem with Whitfield is that it contradicts the specific
intent doctrine it purports to serve. Because the specific and general
intent dichotomy was designed to deal with the problem of the intoxi-
cated offender,' it follows that voluntary intoxication should not be
allowed to negate the mental element of those crimes substantially
more likely to be committed if the actor is intoxicated."°
It is for this reason that the Model Penal Code does not allow volun-
tary intoxication to negate its version of recklessness. " Voluntary in-
toxication cannot negate this mental element, which is very close to
most common definitions of implied malice,"' because drunkenness
makes recklessness more likely."2 This reasoning applies equally well
to implied malice murder."'
108. See People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 377 (Cal. 1969).
109. See id.
110. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the
actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would
observe in the actor's situation.
Id,
111. Cf. Whiield, 868 P.2d at 295 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
112. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.08 cmt. 1 (1985).
[TIhere is the fundamental point that awareness of the potential consequences
of excessive drinking on the capacity of human beings to gauge the risks
incident to their conduct is by now so dispersed in our culture that it is not
unfair to postulate a general equivalence between the risks created by the
conduct of the drunken actor and the risks created by his conduct in becom-
ing drunk. Becoming so drunk as to destroy temporarily the actor's powers
of perception and judgment is conduct that plainly has no affirmative social
value to counterbalance the potential danger. Tw actor's moral culpability
lies in engaging in such conduct.
Id. (emphasis added).
113. See Cirincione v. State, 540 A.2d 1151, 1154 n.1 (Md. App. 1988).
The real difficulty concerns the intoxicated person who conducts himself in a
very risky way but, because of his drunkenness, fails to realize it. If his con-
duct causes death, should he escape murder liability? The person who uncon-
sciously creates risk because he is voluntarily drunk is perhaps morally
The facts of Whitfield, provide the best evidence of that decision's
absurdity. As the Whitfield court recognized, sufficiently aggravated
drunk driving can increase a defendant's liability for a vehicular homi-
cide to second-degree murder."4 After Whitfield, however, sufficiently
severe intoxication can simultaneously mitigate liability to involuntary
or vehicular manslaughter by negating implied malice."5 Allowing the
same fact to both aggravate and mitigate liability can only confuse ju-
ries. As Justice Mosk noted, after Whitfield, jurors will now be con-
fronted with the following "multiple anomalies":
(1) a grossly intoxicated defendant may be punished less than a legally intoxicat-
ed, but not stuporous, defendant; (2) the parties will use the same evidence of
intoxication to both prove and disprove culpability and the defendant will try to
prove a greater degree of intoxication while the prosecution will try to prove a
lesser degree, thereby doubly confusing the jury; and (3) if intoxication is success-
fully invoked as a defense to implied-malice murder, a drunk driver could receive
a significantly higher penalty (Pen. Code, § 191.5) than someone who commits
another reckless act and is convicted of only involuntary manslaughter (id.,
§§ 192(b), 193(b)).' ,
Nothing in Whitfield can possibly justify further confusing California's
homicide law. Whitfield created a needless loophole when it allowed
voluntary intoxication to negate implied malice murder. Voluntary con-
duct that makes the existence of a mental state more likely should not
be a defense to that same mental element. Any reform of implied malice
murder should specifically exclude voluntary intoxication as a defense
and close the Whitfield loophole.
Whitfield's contradictions prompted a legislative response. In 1995 the
legislature passed and the governor signed SB 121, which overturned
Whitfield by modifying Penal Code section 22."'
worse than one who does so because he is sober but mentally deficient. At
all events, the cases generally hold that drunkenness does not negative a
depraved heart by blotting out consciousness of risk, and the Model Penal
Code, which generally requires awareness of the risk for depraved-heart mur-
der (and for recklessness manslaughter), so provides.
Id. (quoting WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN ScoTt, CRIMINAL LAW 545 (1972)).
114. See Whi~field, 868 P.2d at 281.
115. See id. at 279.
116. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 584 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., concurring).
117. After SB 121, PENAL CODE § 22 reads as follows:
'(a) No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication
is less criminal by reason of his or her having been in that condition. Evi-
dence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the capacity
to form any mental states for the crime charged, including, buy not limited
to, purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, or malice afore-
thought, with which the accused committed the act.
"'(b) Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of
whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent or,
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While SB 121 does overturn Whitfield it may not solve the problem
posed by voluntary intoxication and implied malice. Dicta in People v.
Saille" creates the possibility of a successful due process attack
against any narrow effort to overturn Whitfield." 9 The author believes
that SB 121 is constitutional; the notion that the Due Process Clause
protects the voluntary intoxication defense is wrong. 20 Yet, the threat
from SaiUe, however unreasonable, remains."' While SB 121 is a good
effort to achieve the limited objective of overturning Whitfield, any com-
prehensive reform of California's homicide law should contemplate a
more fundamental change to give second-degree murder maximum secu-
rity from constitutional attack.
2. Second-Degree Felony Murder
The problem of nonstatutory crimes"= manifests itself again in the
problem of second-degree felony murder. The Penal Code classifies as
first-degree murder those homicides committed in the course of "arson,
rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking,"
or a variety of serious sex crimes." This embodies the modem ap-
proach to felony murder, which limits this crime to homicides committed
in the course of certain very serious felonies.'24
In addition to the Penal Code's felony murder, the courts have created
an additional crime-second-degree felony murder.'25 Since the adop-
tion of Penal Code in 1872, courts have inferred that homicides commit-
ted during the commission of felonies other than those listed in Penal
Code section 189 were second-degree murder.'26 This crime has no stat-
utory sanction, but nonetheless "lies embedded in our law." 7 Any re-
when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated deliberated,
or harbored express malice aforethought.
"'(c) voluntary intoxication includes the voluntary injection, or taking by an-
other means of any intoxicating liquor, drug, or other substance. (Ch. 793.)
118. 820 P.2d 588 (1991).
119. See infm notes 357-63 and accompanying text.
120. See infra note 360 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 360-63 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 75-96 and accompanying text.
123. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
124. See 2 WAYNE R. LA FAVE & AusTiN Scorr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 7.5(b), at 208-09 (1986).
125. People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 715 n.19 (Cal. 1983).
126. See id.
127. People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1966).
form of homicide law should explicitly abolish this particular crime, as it
is both unnecessary and confusing.
Initially, "relatively unlimited possibilities existed, in connection with
the many classes of statutory felonies, for application of the felony-mur-
der doctrine to find second degree murder."'28 These usually involved
aggravated batteries but were extended to many other felonies.'29
Over the last thirty years, the California Supreme Court substantially
reduced the scope of second degree felony murder, limiting it to those
felonies which, when viewed in the abstract, are inherently dangerous to
human life,' ° A few felonies have satisfied this stringent standard."'
Most felonies, however, are not inherently dangerous under the Philips.
test.'
32
For a felony to be inherently dangerous to human life, there must be
"a high probability that it will result in death." " By borrowing the dan-
gerousness standard of Watson, the California Supreme Court has effec-
tively transformed second-degree felony murder into a form of implied
malice murder.'" The only difference is that implied malice requires the
defendant to also subjectively appreciate the danger of his conduct. 5
The California Supreme Court thus has rendered second degree felony
murder unnecessary.'36 Since the underlying felony must be inherently
dangerous in the abstract, any act constituting a felony will, in practice,
128. 1 BERNARD E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 493, at
557 (2d ed. 1988).
129. See, e.g., People v. Balkwell, 76 P. 1017, 1018 (Cal. 1904) (involving death from
illegal abortion); People v. Bauman, 103 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940) (involv-
ing larceny).
130. See Phillips, 414 P.2d at 360.
131. See, e.g., People v. Nichols, 474 P.2d 673, 681 (Cal. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 910 (1971) (involving willful and malicious burning of a motor vehicle); People v.
Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 653-54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (involving willful or wan-
ton disregard for safety of persons or property while eluding a peace officer); People
v. Morse, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343, 355-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (involving reckless or mali-
cious possession of a destructive device); Brooks v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. Rptr. 762,
764-65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (interfering with a law officer by threat or violence).
132. See, e.g., People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894, 895 (Cal. 1984) (involving unli-
censed practice of medicine); People v. Henderson, 560 P.2d 1180, 1184-85 (Cal. 1977)
(involving false imprisonment); People v. Lopez, 489 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Cal. 1971)
(involving escape); People v. Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361, 1370 (Cal. 1971) (involving pos-
session of a firearm by an ex-felon); Phillips, 414 P.2d at 361 (involving grand theft);
People v. Williams, 406 P.2d 647, 650 (Cal. 1965) (involving conspiracy to possess
methedrine).
133. People v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279, 285 (Cal. 1981).
134. See id.
135. Id. at 283.
136. See id.
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be inherently dangerous.'37 Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of
those who commit such felonies will subjectively appreciate the danger
of their conduct."
Thus, second-degree felony murders would still be murders without
the felony murder rule. It is a potentially confusing redundancy that
California's homicide law would be better off without.
Nor should second degree felony murder be saved through expansion.
Expanding it to include felonies committed in a highly dangerous manner
would still leave the crime too similar to implied malice murder. The
only other alternative, expanding it to include all felonies regardless of
the danger they posed, would risk the gross miscarriages of justice asso-
ciated with the worst applications of the felony murder rule.1 a Any re-
form of the law of homicide should eliminate this part of the felony mur-
der doctrine.'4
For the same reasons, California should abolish the crime known as
"misdemeanor manslaughter." Currently, involuntary manslaughter is a
homicide committed either through criminal negligence or "in the com-
mission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony."'4 ' To ameliorate
this harsh doctrine, the courts require that "the act in question must be
dangerous to human life or safety" and committed with criminal in-
tent."'42 As in second-degree felony murder, this limitation has made in-
voluntary manslaughter redundant.' The mens rea for involuntary man-
slaughter is criminal negligence." This is "'such a departure from what
would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent or careful man under the
same circumstances as to be incompatible with a proper regard for hu-
man life, or, in other words, a disregard of human life or an indifference
to consequences.'"'45 It is difficult to see how committing an inherently
dangerous act with criminal intent will not satisfy criminal negligence.
137. See id. at 285.
138. 2 LA FAVE & ScoTr, supra note 124, § 7.4 at 205 (finding little practical differ-
ence between subjective and objective standards for knowledge of danger of conduct,
as most will know that their conduct is dangerous).
139. See, e.g., State v. Robinett, 279 S.W. 696 (Mo. 1926) (convicting the defendant
under felony murder for the illegal manufacture of liquor).
140. There are, however, good reasons for maintaining first-degree felony murder.
See infra notes 271-313 and accompanying text.
141. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
142. People v. Stuart, 302 P.2d 5, 9 (Cal. 1956).
143. See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
144. People v. Penny, 285 P.2d 926, 937 (Cal. 1955).
145. Id. (quoting 26 AM. JUR. Homicide § 210 (1940)).
Like second-degree felony murder, it is a redundancy that California
should eliminate.
3. First-Degree Murder
Unlike other aspects of its homicide law, California's definition of first-
degree murder does not contain any structural flaws. The first-degree
murder definition is not as archaic as the use of malice, nor as incon-
sistent as second degree felony murder. Nonetheless, first-degree murder
still needs work.
First-degree murder consists of three different categories: felony mur-
der, premeditated killing, and murder perpetrated by special means such
as torture, poison, armor-piercing bullets or an explosive or destructive
device. 4' The problem lies with the latter two definitions, which try to
separate the most cold-blooded killings for heightened punishment. This
creates two problems. First, the requisite cold-bloodedness is very diffi-
cult to define, and second, these types of murders do not necessarily
warrant more punishment.
Defining murder by torture, poisoning, or other specific means as first-
degree is drawn from the common-law tradition of identifying particular
means of committing homicide as particularly abhorrent and punishing
them with even greater severity.'47 Thus in 1530, after someone poi-
soned a number of poor people who were the guests of the Bishop of
Rochester, the government elevated murder by poison to high treason,
entitling the government to boil the offender to death.'48 Similarly, the
common law made killing by stabbing a non-clergiable offense, even
when committed without malice.48 The common law also regarded cer-
146. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
All murder which is perpetrated by means of a destructive device or explo-
sive, knowing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or
armor, poison, lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliber-
ate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration of,
or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem,
kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act punishable under Section 286, 288,
288a, or 289, or any murder which is perpetrated by means of discharging a
firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the
vehicle with the intent to inflict death, is murder of the first degree. All
other kinds of murders are of the second degree.
Id.
147. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
148. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 44. The government removed this special punish-
ment soon after by the statute that excluded murders with "malice prepensed" from
the benefit of clergy. Id. at 44-45.
149. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 193. Blackstone states that this grew out of
the "frequent quarrels and stabbings with short daggers, between the Scotch [sic] and
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tain ways of killing as bearing particularly strong evidence of malice,
such as when the killer lay in wait for his victim."'°
The specific means portion of California Penal Code section 189 is a
continuation of this practice.'5' It treats both a particularly unpleasant
or dangerous way of killing such as murder by torture, explosive device
or armor-piercing bullets, and manners of killing that strongly show pre-
meditation, such as lying in wait or poison, as a type of murder that
warrants extra punishment.'52
The problem with these distinctions is that most of them serve little
purpose. As premeditated killings are already first-degree murder, those
crimes specifying cold-blooded ways of killing are redundant. Further-
more, there is usually little reason to punish one method of killing more
severely than another. "For, in point of solid and substantial justice, it
cannot be said that the mode of killing, whether by stabbing, strangling
or shooting, can either extenuate or enhance guilt. . . ."' While the
defendant's mental state will have a great deal to do with his moral re-
sponsibility, the manner in which the victim is killed is generally immate-
rial; the victim is just as dead regardless of the manner of the killing.
The one exception is the crime that demonstrates a mental state other
than premeditation: murder by torture. In addition to the malice required
by all the other specific act forms of first degree murder,"u murder by
torture also requires an intent to cause pain and suffering.'5 This desire
to have the victim suffer certainly makes the defendant more culpable
and thus deserving of greater punishment."l While there is ample rea-
son to punish this form of murder more severely, there is little need to
enhance punishment for the other ways of committing murder.'57
the English at the accession of James the first." Id.
150. Id. at 199.
151. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
152. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
153. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 193.
154. See People v. Mattison, 481 P.2d 193, 196 (Cal. 1971).
155. People v. Proctor, 842 P.2d 1100, 1115-16 (Cal. 1992).
156. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654-55 (1990) (inflicting mental anguish or
physical abuse before the victim's death is a constitutionally sufficient justification for
imposing the death penalty).
157. It is also worth noting that since 1990, "torture" has also been a separate
crime. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West Supp. 1995). This makes killing during tor-
ture a prime candidate for inclusion in the felony murder statute. See infra notes
331-33 and accompanying text.
Besides the manner-of-killing distinction, the other problem with first-
degree murder is premeditation. While Penal Code section 189 states that
the killing must be "willful, deliberate, and premeditated," " the courts
have focused on premeditation and deliberation.69 The focus of these
efforts has been to devise a way to meaningfully differentiate between
premeditation and simple intent to kill without excluding the truly cold-
blooded murders from extra sanction." ° The courts' lack of meaningful
success in this task, however, raises serious doubts about the propriety
of retaining premeditation as a means of measuring culpability. 6'
At first, premeditation was expanded to the point where simple specif-
ic intent to kill satisfied the premeditation and deliberation require-
ment.62 Understandably, this led to widespread concern about maintain-
ing a distinction between first-and second-degree murder."u Eventually,
the California Supreme Court changed course, finding that premeditation
required "substantially more reflection than may be involved in the mere
formation of a specific intent to kill."" "Reflection" provided a tempo-
ral requirement. While there may be "'no appreciable space of time be-
tween the intention to kill and the act of killing, '"" it must first be pre-
ceded by some reflection."
While there is a temporal component to premeditation, it is inexact.
"Neither the statute nor the court undertakes to measure in units of time
the length of the period during which the thought must be pondered
before it can ripen into an intent which is truly deliberate and premedi-
tated."'67 Premeditation must be examined on an individual basis and
158. CAL PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
159. Cf. People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942, 949 (Cal. 1968) (establishing a three-part
test to determine if there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of premeditation and
deliberation.).
160. See id.
161. Id. at 948 (stating that classifying murder as first- or second- degree "would be
meaningless if 'deliberation' and 'premeditation' were construed as requiring no more
reflection than may be involved in the mere formation of a specific intent to kill");
People v. Valentine, 169 P.2d 1, 8 (1946) (stating that it is erroneous to differentiate
manslaughter and murder "on the basis of deliberate intent"); People v. Watts, 247 P.
884, 893 (Cal. 1926) (inferring premeditation from intent to kill); People v. Fowler,
174 P. 892, 893 (Cal. 1918) (same); In re Thomas C., 228 Cal. Rptr. 430, 436 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (noting that deliberate intent is only an essential element of first degree
murder); supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Watts, 247 P. at 893; Fowler, 174 P. at 893.
163. See People v. Wolff, 394 P.2d 959, 974 (Cal. 1964); People v. Holt, 153 P.2d 21,
37 (Cal. 1944); James A. Pike, What is Second Degree Murder in Caliornia, 9
S. CAL. L. REv. 112, 120 (1936).
164. People v. Thomas, 156 P.2d 7, 18 (Cal. 1945).
165. Id. (quoting People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17, 30 (1864)).
166. Id.
167. Id.
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quality of reflection is elevated over the quantity of reflection.Iu "The
time would vary with different individuals and under differing circum-
stances. The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the
extent of the reflection.' '
Unfortunately, the courts have been unable to get more specific than
this. Outside of circumstantial means of proving premeditation, it is ex-
tremely difficult to set guidelines for how much reflection is enough to
demonstrate premeditation because neither courts nor jurors can read a
defendant's mind. In People v. Anderson7 ' the California Supreme Court
attempted to construct a model for examining circumstantial evidence of
premeditation.' It found that three types of circumstantial evidence
support premeditation:
(1) facts about how and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which
show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable
as intended to result in, the killing-what may be characterized as "planning"
activity; (2) facts about the defendant's prior relationship and/or conduct with the
victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a "motive" to kill the victim,
which inference of motive, together with facts of type (1) or (3), would in turn
support an inference that the killing was the result of "a pre-existing reflection"
and "careful thought and weighing of considerations" rather than "mere unconsid-
ered or rash impulse hastily executed" (People v. Thomas, supra, 25 Cal.2d 880, at
pp. 898, 900, 901, 156 P.2d 7, at p. 14); (3) facts about the nature of the killing
from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and
exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a "precon-
ceived design" to take his victim's life in a particular way for a "reason" which the
jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2)."
The complexity of this test underscores the difficulty of ascertaining
premeditation. Anderson involved the murder of a ten-year-old girl by her
mother's live-in boyfriend.'' The killing was brutal; the girl was stabbed
more than sixty times by the defendant. 4 There was also evidence of a
sexual motivation to the attack: the defendant had torn off the girl's
dress and underpants.' Finally, there was evidence that the girl had
fled and that the defendant pursued her during the attack. 6
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. 447 P.2d 942 (Cal. 1968).
171. Id. at 949.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 943.
174. Id. at 945.
175. Id.
176. Id.
The Anderson Court split over the premeditation issue.'77 The four-
justice majority held that none of the three forms of circumstantial evi-
dence showing premeditation'78 was present.'78 The majority character-
ized the killing as "a 'random' violent, indiscriminate attack.""1 n Two jus-
tices vehemently disagreed with this result, finding the sexual motive, the
duration of the assault, and the pursuit through several rooms sufficient
to support premeditation. 8'
That reasonable jurists can disagree so severely on the issue of pre-
meditation shows how difficult it is to define this concept.' 2 While a
majority of the court found the killing to be a motiveless spasm of vio-
lence, the others found that the killing was intended to achieve sexual
gratification. 1" Yet both sides made plausible cases. As the majority
pointed out, it is almost impossible to infer motive from the brutality of
the attack"s and there was no evidence that the defendant had any sex-
ual contact with the victim during the attack."n Yet, as the Burke dis-
sent noted, the sexual nature of several wounds, the fact that the defen-
dant tore off the victim's clothes and removed his own clothes before the
attack strongly suggested a sexual motivation behind the assault."'s This
demonstrates how difficult it can be to determine the existence of mo-
tive, and thus premeditation, under Anderson.
The California Supreme Court recently backed away from Ander-
son."'87 "[T]he Anderson analysis was intended as a framework to assist
reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence supports an inference
that the killing resulted from [premeditation and that] [i]t did not refash-
ion the elements of first degree murder or alter the substantive law of
murder in any way." l" Thus, "[ulnreflective reliance on Anderson for a
definition of premeditation is now inappropriate."'8 8
177. Id. at 942.
178. The three forms of circumstantial evidence are conduct before the killing, mo-
tive, and the manner of killing. See id. at 949.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 955 (Burke, J., dissenting). The seventh justice did not reach the pre-
meditation issue, finding enough evidence of felony murder to support first-degree
murder. Id. at 956 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
182. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
183. Anderson, 447 P.2d at 949.
184. Id. at 953.
185. Id. at 945.
186. Id. at 955 (Burke, J., dissenting).
187. See infra notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
188. People v. Thomas, 828 P.2d 101, 114 (Cal. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1006
(1993).
189. Id.
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The court expanded upon this theme in People v. Perez." It noted
that Anderson's guidelines were "descriptive, not normative," and intend-
ed only to "aid reviewing courts in assessing whether" the killing was
premeditated. 9' Most importantly, the Perez court found that:
[i]n identifying categories of evidence bearing on premeditation and deliberation,
Anderson did not purport to establish an exhaustive list that would exclude all
other types and combinations of evidence that could support a finding of premedi-
tation and deliberation. The Anderson factors, while helpful for purposes of re-
view, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor are
they exclusive."
Finally, in People v. Pride,'93 the state high court continued its retreat
from Anderson when it held that the three Anderson factors need not
"be present in some special combination or that they be accorded a par-
ticular weight.""g Anderson has thus gone from a three-prong test with
a clear hierarchy of preferred evidence to an informal set of guidelines
that may be discarded if other evidence supporting premeditation does
not fit the model.'
While there has been a retreat from the Anderson test, no well-rea-
soned substitute case has stepped into the void. The Perez court, after
reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment,"
determined that the three Anderson factors-planning, motive, and
means-were all present, thus supporting the premeditation finding.'97
There was a similar reliance on the three Anderson factors in Thomas
and Pride."g
The problem with premeditation is not with the court, but with the
concept of premeditation. The problem is that it is too difficult to ascer-
tain when premeditation exists.
The difficulty arises when we try to discover what is meant by the words deliber-
ate and premeditated. A long series of decisions, beginning many years ago, has
given to these words a meaning that differs to some extent from the one revealed
upon the surface. To deliberate and premeditate within the meaning of the statute,
190. 831 P.2d 1159 (Cal. 1992).
191. Id. at 1163.
192. Id. (citation omitted).
193. 833 P.2d 643 (Cal. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1323 (1993).
194. Id. at 674.
195. See supra notes 170-94 and accompanying text.
196. See Perez, 831 P.2d at 1162.
197. Id. at 1163.
198. See Pride, 833 P.2d at 674; People v. Thomas, 828 P.2d 101, 114 (Cal. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1006 (1993).
one does not have to plan the murder days or hours or even minutes in advance,
as where one lies in wait for one's enemy or places poison in his food and drink.
The law does not say that any particular length of time must intervene between
the violation and the act. The human brain, we are reminded, acts at times with
extraordinary celerity .... One may say indeed in a rough way that an intent to
kill is always deliberate and premeditated within the meaning of the law unless
the mind is so blinded by pain or rage as to make the act little more than an auto-
matic or spontaneous reaction to the environment-not strictly automatic or spon-
taneous, for there could then be no intent, and yet a near approach thereto.""
Justice Cardozo was right. Given the speed at which we think, and the
relatively long time it takes for us to act on our thoughts, all intentional
killers have thought about killing and then decided to kill the victim
before the killing occurred. If the intent to kill occurred only after the
killing act took place, then there could be no intent to kill as far as the
criminal law is concerned. °0
As difficult as premeditation is for jurists, it is even more difficult for
jurors.
What we have is merely a privilege offered to the jury to find the lesser degree
when the suddenness of the intent, the vehemence of the passion, seems to call
irresistibly for the exercise of mercy. I have no objection to giving them this dis-
pensing power, but it should be given to them directly and not in a mystifying
cloud of words."
The problem is that the question posed by premeditation-how much
deliberation is enough-has no clear answer.
If one were to ask the average person what he would consider to be a deliberate,
premeditated murder, he would probably get an answer such as this: "It would be
a murder in which the defendant after carefully weighing all alternatives for a
long time had finally committed the fatal act." That is the kind of murder the leg-
islators had in mind in drafting the statute. So, if this average person were asked
how long a time of meditation would be needed, he would probably say, "Oh,
several days; at least over-night." But, if he were pushed further, he would proba-
bly conclude that several hours, even one hour, would be enough to constitute
"premeditation." And, then, it would not take long to convince him, by the use of
illustrations, that all that is needed to satisfy the term is that the murderer delib-
erate "an appreciable period of time." Finally, in the end, he would probably admit
that an "appreciable period of time" may be satisfied by a few seconds."
This ephemeral distinction should not mean the difference between
first- and second-degree murder.
Even if premeditation were readily definable, it is not the best way to
distinguish between first- and second-degree murder. Length of delibera-
199. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, What Medicine Can Do for Law, in LAw AND LrfERATURE
97-99 (1931) (footnote omitted).
200. Cf. CAL PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1988). "In every crime or public offense there
must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent .... " Id.
201. CARDOZO, supra note 199, at 100.
202. MORELAND, supra note 7, at 208-09.
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tion is not a consistent indicator of moral blame. "Prior reflection may
reveal the uncertainties of a tortured conscience rather than exceptional
depravity. The very fact of a long internal struggle may be evidence that
the homicidal impulse was deeply aberrational and far more the product
of extraordinary circumstances than a true reflection of the actor's nor-
mal character."2"3 It is also present in some of the least blameworthy
homicides-mercy killings.2" Anderson, with its savage sexual mutila-
tion of a young girl,"' is an excellent example of a murder far worse
than many premeditated killings.2"
Premeditation is thus both confusing and unnecessary. It has needless-
ly complicated California's law of homicide while providing a dubious
distinction between first- and second-degree murder.
California's homicide law needs substantial revision. Before deciding
what changes must be made, it will first be necessary to establish the
guiding principles behind any reform. Too much criminal law is made on
an ad hoc basis. An intrinsically consistent reform can save California
much of the doubt and inconsistency that has plagued its law of homi-
cide.
II. STRUCTURING THE REFORM
Before embarking on any reform of California's homicide law, it is first
necessary to structure the reform. Lack of planning and structure was
the bane of the old criminal codes. °7 California's homicide law is a col-
203. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. at 127 (1980).
204. See id.
205. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
206. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 94.
As much cruelty, as much indifference to the life of others, a disposition at
least as dangerous to society, probably even more dangerous, is shown by
sudden as by premeditated murders. The following cases appear to me to set
this in a clear light. [A man,] passing along the road, sees a boy sitting on a
bridge over a deep river and, out of mere wanton barbarity, pushes him into
it and so drowns him. A man makes advances to a girl who repels him. He
deliberately but instantly cuts her throat. A man civilly asked to pay a just
debt pretends to get the money, loads a rifle and blows out his creditor's
brains. In none of these cases is there premeditation unless the word is used
in a sense as unnatural as "aforethought" in "malice aforethought," but each
represents even more diabolical cruelty and ferocity than that which is in-
volved in murders premeditated in the natural sense of the word.
Id.
207. Herbert Wechsler, The American Law Institute: Some Observations on Its
lection of common-law concepts and language that has changed only
incrementally and sporadically, with no consistent world view."' Any
reform should avoid repeating these mistakes. A good way to start is to
examine the purpose of criminal law.
"The object of criminal law is to deter the individual from committing
acts that injure society by harming others, their property, or the public
welfare, and to express society's condemnation of such acts by punishing
them."2"' These two properties-preventing crime and expressing
society's moral condemnation-are similar but distinct interests that
must be served by any reform of the criminal law.
The need for moral sanction comes from the community's need to see
certain wrongful acts punished.2"' "Inherent in the concept of moral re-
gard as a rule for human conduct is the idea that there must be negative
consequences for its violation."' If violations of societal norms are not
identified and punished as crimes, there is an inevitable risk of more and
more members becoming alienated from society. Criminal law is thus
part of the glue that binds society by sanctioning society's moral val-
ues.
21 2
Crime prevention, on the other hand, focuses generally on deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.2"3 This theory of criminal law has
been predominant for much of the last century."
Model Penal Code, 42 A.B.A. J. 321, 321 (1956). "viewing the country as a whole, our
penal codes are fragmentary, old, disorganized and often accidental in their coverage,
their growth largely fortuitous in origin, their form a combination of enactment and
of common law that only history explains." Id.
208. See supra notes 7-62 and accompanying text.
209. People v. Roberts, 826 P.2d 274, 298 (Cal. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 436
(1992).
210. See Samuel H. Pillsbury; Evil and the Law of Murder, 24 DAViS L. REv. 437,
442-43 (1990).
211. Id.
212. OLIVER W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 170
(1920). "The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life." Id.
A final justification of a penalty structure which takes account of resulting
harm can be based on the "condemnatory" theory of punishment. This theory
sees punishment as a symbolic statement that the conduct on which the
punishment is based is strongly in conflict with societal norms. An important
practical function of punishment, according to this view, is defining and pre-
serving society's value system.
David J. Karp, Note, Causation in the Model Penal Code, 78 COLUM. L REv. 1249,
1258-1259 (1978) (footnote omitted).
213. See 1 LA FAVE & Scorr, supra note 124, § 1.5(a)(2)-(4) at 32-34.
214. See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 7, at 49; Wechsler, supra note 207, at 393 (domi-
nant purpose of the law of homicide is protecting life); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 1.02(1)(a), (2)(a)-(b) (1980).
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Unfortunately, crime prevention is much easier to advocate than ac-
complish. Deterrence is very difficult to measure,"' making the deter-
rent effect of any criminal measure debatable.21 Similar difficulties also
plague the concept of rehabilitation, as a rationale for punishment."7
Any reform must recognize and reconcile these goals. No goal can be
more worthy than reducing homicides, and reforms of homicide law that
can prevent homicides through deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilita-
tion should be encouraged. Yet society's sense of right and wrong should
be heeded. Criminal law that varies significantly from popular notions of
justice ultimately undermines respect for the law.1 8
Treating conduct too lightly is particularly corrosive to public respect
for law and order. The diminished capacity experience219 is an excellent
example of what happens when legal innovations designed to help defen-
dants stray too far from common notions of right and wrong. In 1978
Dan White, a former San Francisco supervisor, successfully used the
diminished capacity defense while on trial for the killings of Mayor
George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk.22 ° In spite of overwhelm-
ing evidence of premeditation,22" ' the jury accepted his diminished ca-
pacity defense and convicted him of only voluntary manslaughter.222 In
addition to causing a riot in San Francisco, this verdict also crystallized
215. See generally Peter Passell, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: A Sta-
tistical Test, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 396 (Hugo Bedau &
Chester M. Pierce eds., 1976) (analyzing statistics collected by the Justice Depart-
ment). "It cannot be proven that executions do not serve as a deterrent to murder.
Proof is simply beyond the capabilities of empirical social science." Id. at 410.
216. See 1 LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 124, § 1.5(a)(1) at 31 n.12.
217. See id. at 33; HERBERT L. PACKER, The Practical Limits of Deterrence, in CON-
TEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS 102, 105 (Rudolph J.
Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds., 1972).
218. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976); MAITLAND &
MONTAGUE, supra note 55, at 72-73. Criminal law that classifies and punishes conduct
too harshly leads to its subversion. Thus, jury nullification was common in the United
States when the death penalty was the mandatory punishment for all murders. See
Woodson, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976). Similarly, the vast application of capital punish-
ment in common-law England led to repeated faking of the reading test so that even
illiterates could claim the benefit of clergy by "reading" a previously memorized and
well-known part of the Bible and thus escape capital punishment. See MAITLAND &
MONTAGUE, supra note 55, at 72-73.
219. See supra note 48.
220. See People v. White, 172 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
221. Id. at 613-14.
222. Id. at 615.
public opposition to the diminished capacity defense, leading to its legis-
lative abolition.223
In addition to serving these broad policy goals, any reform should be
well constructed. Along with advancing several necessary but potentially
conflicting goals, such as deterrence and punishment, statutes should be
clear, comprehensive, practical, and constitutional. Any reform worth the
effort must balance the first three objectives while assuring the scheme's
constitutionality.
Lack of clarity is the single greatest falling of statutory law. The fore-
most problem with unclear statutes is that they place too much power in
the courts. Courts are never shy to state that they do not second-guess
the wisdom of the legislation they interpret.224 Ambiguous statutes, how-
ever, make judicial policymaking much easier."' As the California Su-
preme Court's forays into diminished capacity and imperfect self-defense
demonstrate, courts will fill any policy void left by ambiguous statutes.
In order to wrest control of policy from the unelected branch, statutes
must be clear.
Furthermore, a clearly written statute is easier on everyone who has to
deal with the law.22 Overly complex, poorly written statutes are prone
to misinterpretation and frustrate those who must deal with them. 7
At the same time, penal statutes should be comprehensive. Statutes
should attempt to prohibit as much similarly situated conduct as is possi-
ble. For example, it would make no sense to only prohibit kidnapping
committed on a Thursday. The goal of comprehensiveness is served by
expanding the prohibition to the rest of the week.
There is a limit, however, to the sweep of any penal sanction. Given
the enormous variety of wrongful conduct, it is inevitable that some
misconduct will not be covered by the criminal law.2 8 Any attempt to
be truly comprehensive runs the risk of bogging down the criminal law
223. See Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J.
CRiM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 25-26 n.88 (1984).
224. See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993); Wells
Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, 811 P.2d 1025, 1035 (Cal. 1991).
225. See MORELAND, supra note 7, at 211 (recommending definitions in statutes to
"prevent the courts from defeating the purpose of the legislature by watering down
the meaning of ... words").
226. See, e.g., People v. Holt, 277 Cal. Rptr. 323, 324 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
227. Id.
228. See 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 124, § 1.2(e), at 14, n.18 (citing Peebles v.
State, 28 S.E. 920, 920 (1897)).
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in needless detail.' For the sake of clarity, some comprehensiveness
must be sacrificed.
Above all, any reform must be practical. This means that it must have
a decent possibility of being enacted. A reform that never passes legisla-
tive muster is a waste of time and energy. Most importantly, this means
that any reform should conform to popular notions of justice.'a By both
nature and design, legislatures are very sensitive to public opinion."
Any reform contrary to public opinion is unlikely to survive legislative
scrutiny.' Furthermore, since the reform proposed in this Article in-
tends to modify or repeal provisions that have been enacted by initiative,
it will be necessary to place them on the ballot for ratification.'
Finally, any reform must be constitutional. This is more than civics-
book obedience to the state and federal constitutions. It means that any
reform must be written with an eye towards current and future interpre-
tations of the Constitution. The law of homicide is simply too important
to be a test case for constitutional theory. The threat of invalidation
typically will far outweigh the benefit of any innovations that stretch the
borders of the constitutionally permissible.
III. THE REFORMS
This section applies the principles of part II to the faults identified in
Part I. As some aspects of California's homicide law should be left un-
changed, this section will mention them and discuss why they should be
retained. The final mixture of reform and retention, if adopted, would
provide California with a homicide law more consistent and coherent
than currently in place.
A. Classification
The structure of the' criminal law is provided by the classification of
crimes. Creating different crimes for different forms of criminal behavior
229. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). A statute that
goes to the other extreme, one that attempts to cover all possible misconduct
through broad and general statutory language, runs the risk of being unconstitutional-
ly vague. Id.
230. See THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. CAL CONST. art.. 11, § 10(c).
is central to any notion of having the punishment fit the crime. While all
criminal homicides were once treated the same,2" common-law jurisdic-
tions abandoned this practice more than two hundred years ago."
Modem criminal law classifies criminal homicides in a wide array of
offenses.23 Because there are many different types of criminal homi-
cides, each with its own level of culpability, California should continue
to grade homicides.
1. Degree
American jurisdictions have been dividing murder into degrees since
the landmark Pennsylvania reforms of 1794.237 Murder was originally
divided into degrees to keep less culpable murderers from being subject
to capital punishment.2" Although California does not use first- and sec-
ond-degree murder as the sole means of distinguishing capital from
noncapital homicides,' there is still good reason to retain the distinc-
tion between first- and second-degree murder.
The notion of dispensing with degrees of murder is most forcefully
asserted in the Model Penal Code. The Code focused on the Pennsylvania
model, which used premeditation and deliberation to distinguish first-
from second-degree murders.24 ° It found premeditation too difficult to
determine24 and an insufficient indicator of culpability to distinguish
between capital punishment and a prison sentence.242 Nor was the Mod-
el Penal Code swayed by those states that distinguished types of
noncapital murders.243 It found no good reason for distinguishing be-
tween purposeful, knowing, and reckless homicides.2"
234. See 3 STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 4.2(a).
235. See generaUy MORELAND, supra note 7 (discussing the development of the law
of homicide).
236. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 2 (1980).
237. See id.
238. See id. § 210.6 cmt. 4(b).
239. See CAL PENAL CODE § 190.4(a) (West 1988). California distinguishes between
capital and noncapital homicides through a special circumstances finding that is a
necessary precondition to the imposition of capital punishment. Id. Degree is impor-
tant, however, because special circumstances can only be found if defendant is con-
victed of first degree murder. Id. If the jury finds a special circumstance, then a
separate penalty phase is held where the jury determines whether the sentence is the
death penalty or life without the possibility of parole. See id. § 190.1.
240. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b) (1980).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See id. § 210.2 cmt. 3.
244. Id.
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The Model Penal Code does not justify this decision with extensive
analysis. It simply asserts that its three mental states of murder should
be treated the same.24 The closest it comes to detailed analysis is in its
statement that purposeful knowledge and recklessness have a common
theme of indifference to human life.24
There are several good reasons not to rely on this unadorned value
judgment from the drafters of the Model Penal Code. In the first place,
degree plays a role in determining eligibility for the death penalty in Cal-
ifornia, where first-degree murder is a necessary precondition to the
special circumstance finding that transforms a murder into a capital
crime.247 As this reform contemplates keeping capital punishment,248
and since distinguishing between capital and noncapital murder is the
original reason for dividing murder into degrees, murder should retain
degrees.
Another reason for continuing the current degree structure is that
there is a valid way to distinguish between types of murder.24 Since
murder can be sorted into degrees of severity, the Model Penal Code's
rationale for dispensing with degrees disappears. Furthermore, it makes
sense to divide murder into degrees; leaving murder as one undifferen-
tiated crime removes too much discretion from the jury and runs the risk
of leaving juries with "unpalatable" all-or-nothing decisions.2" Retaining
degrees keeps necessary flexibility in the system.
2. Manslaughter
The various forms of manslaughter should be retained. There are homi-
cides that are less culpable than murder but still deserve punishment.
245. Id. "Capital punishment aside, however, there seems to be no basis in principle
for separating purposeful from knowing homicide." Id. "This provision [treating reck-
less homicide manifesting an extreme indifference to human life the same as murder]
reflects the judgment that there is a kind of reckless homicide that cannot fairly be
distinguished in grading terms from homicides committed purposely or knowingly." Id.
§ 210.2 cmt. 4.
246. Id. § 210.2 cmt. 4..
247. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West Supp. 1995).
248. See supra note 2.
249. See iifra notes 316-26 and accompanying text.
250. People v. Geiger, 674 P.2d 1303, 1306-07 (Cal. 1984) (stating that an instruction
on lesser included offenses is required to avoid the unpalatable choice between con-
viction for too high a charge or acquittal even though the defendant has committed
some crime).
Voluntary, involuntary, and vehicular manslaughter fit the bill quite nice-
ly. The only possible objection is to the two forms of manslaughter in-
volving driving: vehicular manslaughter"5 ' and gross vehicular man-
slaughter while intoxicated.252 Like specific means of first-degree mur-
der,"u they single out a particular means of killing for special treat-
ment." Dead is dead, whether by gunshot, knife, or automobile, and
there is no reason to target the automobile for special treatment.
Of the two, gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the easi-
est to justify. Drunk driving is a scourge of American life, killing tens of
thousands every year." The heightened penalty for this particularly fre-
quent lethal conduct demonstrates an effort to deter people from driving
while intoxicated and to thus reduce fatalities.
Vehicular manslaughter is more problematic. The "ordinary" vehicular
manslaughter proscribed in Penal Code section 192 actually involves
three very separate crimes.5 Section 192(c)(1)257 creates a parallel
form of involuntary manslaughter; the only substantive difference be-
tween the two is that 192(c)(1) requires that the killing be committed
while driving a vehicle." There is no reason for this different treatment
simply because a car was used in the killing. The problem that makes
vehicles so dangerous-fatalities caused by drunk driving- is already
punished more severely under Penal Code section 191.5.259 Once drunk
driving is factored out, the automobile becomes significantly less dan-
gerous, and the reason for treating vehicular homicides differently from
other criminally negligent homicides disappears.
The second form of vehicular manslaughter, codified at Penal Code
section 192 subdivision (c)(2),2c parallels the definition of involuntary
251. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(c) (West 1988). There is also a separate form of vehic-
ular manslaughter for vessels. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192.5 (West Supp. 1995).
252. CAL. PENAL CODE § 191.5 (West 1988).
253. See supra notes 146-57 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
255. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990); Ingersoll v.
Palmer, 943 P.2d 1299, 1311 (Cal. 1987).
256. See CAL PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
257. "Except as provided in Section 191.5, driving a vehicle in the commission of
an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, and with gross negligence; or driving a
vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful
manner, and with gross negligence." Id. § 192(c)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
258. See id. § 192(b). This statute defines involuntary manslaughter as a homicide
committed without malice "in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to
felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an un-
lawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection. This subdivision shall not
apply to acts committed in the driving of a vehicle." Id.
259. See id. § 191.5.
260. "Except as provided in paragraph (3), driving a vehicle in the commission of
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manslaughter, except that it involves ordinary negligence. This stems
from the special nature of vehicular homicides and the alleged reluctance
of some to convict drivers who kill of involuntary manslaughter.
2 6
While automobiles occupy a special place in society as a potentially le-
thal instrument that is a necessity to many people, it is difficult to justify
singling it out for this special treatment. While automobiles are danger-
ous when used negligently, so are guns, knives, and many other devices.
Yet none of the others has been singled out for this treatment. Dead is
dead, regardless of the means used.262
Public perceptions toward auto-related deaths is a similarly weak rea-
son to criminalize ordinary negligence. While it may be true that jurors
were once reluctant to punish vehicular homicides very seriously, there
is no reason to believe this today, since public attitudes towards the
most irresponsible drivers have hardened over the years.2"
Nor should the legislature expand this crime to include all civilly negli-
gent homicides. When ordinary civil negligence results in death, the
death is truly accidental. There is no reason to punish the merely neg-
ligent driver for simple bad luck.2" It is understandable why most juris-
dictions require something more than ordinary negligence for criminal
liability.2" As there is no special reason for distinguishing vehicular ho-
micides, the legislature should repeal Penal Code section 192 subdivision
(c)(2).
The final form of vehicular manslaughter, found in Penal Code section
192(c)(3)," punishes deaths that result from drunk driving without
an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, but without gross negligence; or driving a
vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful
manner, but without gross negligence." Id. § 192(c)(2).
261. See 1 WrITON & EPSTEIN, supra note 128, § 526.
262. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
263. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUS-
TICE 7 (2d ed. 1988), BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME
AND JUSTICE: THE DATA 4 (1983) (ranking public perceptions of various crimes, with
vehicular manslaughter seen as worse than robbing a victim at gunpoint and causing
injuries that require hospitalization) [hereinafter THE DATA]. A 1977 survey of public
perception of the seriousness of various crimes rated killing a person by recklessly
driving an automobile as more serious than armed robbery of ten dollars that results
in the wounding of the victim or attempting to kill someone with a gun. Id.
264. Cf. HOLMES, supra note 7, at 58 (criticizing punishing accidental deaths as
felony murder). As a critique of California's first-degree felony murder statute, how-
ever, this argument has many shortcomings. See infra notes 279-90 and accompanying
text.
265. See 1 LA FAVE & SCOTT, supra note 124, § 3.7.
266.
gross fiegligence.16 7 There is no reason for this crime. Drunk driving ho-
micides are already marked for special treatment under section 191.5.2"
Those few drunk driving homicides that do not involve gross negligence
should not be treated as felonies. Ordinary civil negligence, no matter
what form it takes, should not be felonious.
The forms of vehicular manslaughter found in Penal Code section 192
are outdated. They come from a time when jurors were sometimes un-
willing to hold grossly negligent drivers accountable for their actions.2"
Times have changed. Public attitudes towards vehicular killings have
hardened considerably, particularly where drunk driving is involved.7 °
The manifestation of the new public attitude, Penal Code section 191.5,
transforms the other forms of vehicular manslaughter into historical
artifacts. There is no longer any reason to keep these outdated crimes.
3. Felony murder
Although felony murder is not a separate class of homicide, but simply
another form of murder, it is best discussed as a classification issue
because felony murder is distinct from the other types of murder. In
spite of unyielding academic criticism,"' the felony murder rule contin-
ues to flourish.7 Although cynics attribute this retention to misinforma-
Driving a vehicle in violation of section 23140, 23152 or 23153 of the Vehicle
Code and in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, but
without gross negligence; or driving a vehicle in violation of section 23140,
23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code and in the commission of a lawful act
which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, but without gross negli-
gence.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(c)(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
267. Id.
268. Id. § 191.5.
269. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, § 210.2(1)(b) cmt.; HOLMES, supra note 7, at 58;
2 LA FAVE & ScoTr, supra, note 124, § 7.5(h); MORELAND, supra note 7, at 49-53;
PERIGNS & BOYCE, supra note 44, at 70, 136-37; 3 STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 57. But
see David Crump & Susan W. Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8
HARv. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 359 (1985); George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder,
12 S.W. U. L REV. 413, 417 (1981); James J. Hippard, The Unconstitutionality of
Criminal Liability Without Fault: An Argument for a Constitutional Doctrine of
Mens Rea, 10 Hous. L REV. 1039, 1045 (1973); Frederick C. Moesel Jr., A Survey of
Felony Murder, 28 TEMP. LQ. 453, 466 (1955); Richard A. Rosen, Felony Murder and
the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C. L REV. 1103, 1104-1105
(1990).
272. See 2 LA FAVE & SCOTr, supra note 124, § 7.5(h); Crump & Crump, supra note
271, at 359-60. Indeed the persistence of the felony murder doctrine is considered the
single greatest rejection of the Model Penal Code by the states. See Fletcher, supra
note 271, at 413.
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tion or anti-crime hysteria,27 others wonder if the states know some-
thing that the commentators do not.
74
The academic critics have missed much. They have overemphasized
mens rea at the expense of the actus reus. They have ignored the pop-
ular perceptions of the culpability of felony murders and the need for the
criminal law to validate public morality. Most importantly, the critics of
the felony murder rule have focused on the relatively rare, truly acciden-
tal killing in the commission of a felony, while ignoring the reality behind
most felony murders."7
The earliest criticisms of the felony murder rule were based on the
harshness of the common law felony murder doctrine,27 where a killing
in the commission of any unlawful act was murder. 7 While liability
was eventually limited to killings in the commission of felonies, the felo-
ny murder rule was still extremely harsh.278
California's crime of first-degree felony murder is much narrower. The
felonies listed in Penal Code section 189 are the most serious felonies
short of murder.279 Thus it has not needed the narrowing doctrines that
have subverted more open-ended felony murder provisions, such as
California's second-degree felony murder rule. It is simply much less
severe to convict a lethal rapist or arsonist of first-degree murder than it
is to convict a still operator who happens to be involved in a killing.2'8
273. See, e.g., Note, The Felony Murder Rule: In Search of a Viable Doctrine, 23
CATH. LAW. 133, 161 (1978).
274. See Crump & Crump, supra note 271, at 360 n.7 and authorities cited therein.
275. See generally MORELAND, supra note 7, at 42-54 (discussing the felony murder
rule and recommending that it be "weeded out of the law").
276. See 3 STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 57.
277. See LORD EDWARD T. COKE, 3 INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 56 (W.
Clarke & Sons ed., 1817).
If the act be unlawful it is murder. As if A, Meaning to steale a deere in the
park of B, shooteth at the deer, and by the glance of the arrow killeth a boy
that is hidden in a bush: this is murder, for that the act was unlawfull, al-
though A had no intent to hurt the boy, nor knew not of him. But if B, the
owner of the park had shot at his own deer, and without any ill intent had
killed the boy by the glance of his arrow, this had been homicide by misad-
venture, and no felony.
Id. (declension or inconsistent spelling in original).
278. See 3 STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 75-76.
279. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
280. Compare People v. Clark, 789 P.2d 127, 134-35 (Cal.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
973 (1990) (involving arson) and People v. McDowell, 763 P.2d 1269, 1271-72 (Cal.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059 (1989) (involving rape) with State v. Robinett, 279
Therefore, much of the injustice that the critics complain about is absent
from California's first-degree felony murder law.
The modern critics of the felony murder rule are concerned that it
punishes killings as murder without examining the underlying mens
rea.28 ' According to the critics, this leads to the anomalous and unjust
result of some felons being convicted of murder simply because an "acci-
dental" death occurred during the felony.28 "If the object of the [flony
murder] rule is to prevent [accidental killings], it should make accidental
killing with firearms murder, not accidental killing in the effort to steal;
while, if its object is to prevent stealing, it would do better to hang one
thief in every thousand by lot."2" While typically pithy, Justice Holmes's
statement is also a near-perfect example of all that is wrong with the cri-
tiques of felony murder. It places too much emphasis on mens rea and
not enough on the actus reus. Justice Holmes focuses exclusively on the
deterrent rationale of the criminal law, forgetting the many other impor-
tant interests criminal law serves.' Furthermore, the focus on acciden-
tal killings misstates the reality of the felony murder rule. When felony
murder is limited to serious felonies, the risk of a truly accidental killer
being convicted of murder is low. The accidents that concerned Justice
Holmes are very rare exceptions that do not justify dispensing with an
appropriately narrow felony murder rule.
The critics of the felony murder rule are also wrong about the impor-
tance of actus reus in setting criminal liability. Although the robber who
kills may not have meant to kill, the result of his robbery, killing another
person, is far more harmful to society than any ordinary robbery. The
felony murder rule recognizes the greater harm caused by the killing and
accordingly increases culpability. This is fully consistent with basic prin-
ciples of criminal law.'
The closest analogy is found in the law of attempts. It is the near-uni-
versal rule in American jurisdictions that an attempt to commit a crime is
punished less severely than the underlying crime in spite of the fact that
both crimes have the same mental element.2" "Luck" will therefore have
S.W. 696 (Mo. 1926) (involving illegal manufacture of liquor).
281. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. (1980); 2 LA FAVE & Scor, supra
note 124, § 7.5(h); People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965).
282. See HOLMES, supra note 7, at 58; 2 LA FAVE & Scowt, supra note 124, § 7.5(h),
at 232-33.
283. HOLMES, supra note 7, at 58; accord 2 LA FAVE & Scorr, supra note 124,
§ 7.5(h), at 232-33.
284. See HOLMES, supra note 7, at 58.
285. See 2 LA FAVE & Scowt, supra note 124, § 1.2(b),(e), at 10, 14 (discussing the
purpose of criminal law); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 44, at 5-6 (same).
286. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 664 (West 1988) (stating attempt is punishable with
half the punishment for the completed crime); 2 LA FAVE & ScoTr, supra note 124,
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an effect on the criminal's culpability. A hired assassin who shoots at
someone in order to fulfill the "contract" is subject to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole or the death penalty if he 7 is a good
shot;' if his aim is bad and he fails to kill the victim, the punishment is
only life with possibility of parole in seven years.2" There is little differ-
ence between this and felony murder. Under both doctrines, people with
the same mens rea are given different punishments depending upon the
consequences of their actions. The only difference is that under the law
of attempt the "unlucky" criminal receives a windfall because he fails to
complete his crime, while under felony murder the "unlucky" felon who
kills receives more punishment than expected. If not identical, the two
doctrines are at least very closely related.'s
Punishing an attempt less severely than the completed crime is best
justified as a matter of retribution; the person who does less harm to
society by failing to complete the crime warrants less punishment than
one who completes the crime and increases society's loss.29' Retributive
§ 6.3; Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw,
84 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 681 (1994). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1)
(1985) (punishing attempts as seriously as the completed crime except for the most
serious felonies).
287. Males commit most criminal homicides. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATSTrcs-1993, supra note 2, at 430 (providing statistics of arrests by gender). With
this in mind, but mainly for convenience, the masculine form will be used for third
person singular references to perpetrators.
288. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995).
289. See id. § 664(1) (West 1988) (punishing attempted premeditated murder by life
with possibility of parole); id. § 3046 (West Supp. 1995) (providing seven-year min-
imum for life with possibility of parole sentence).
290. See Crump & Crump, supra note 271, at 366-67; Kadish, supra note 286, at
695-696.
291. See Kadish, supra note 286, at 697-702. The thesis of Professor Kadish's article
is that no rational reason exists for reducing punishment "for intentional wrongdo-
ers . .. if by chance the harm they intended or risked does not occur." Id. at 679.
While dismissing most justifications for this doctrine as not serving their intended
purposes, Professor Kadish does recognize that some retributive principles are ad-
vanced by the harm doctrine. See id. at 697-98. He does not find retribution to be a
rational support for the harm doctrine, however, because he finds that punishing a
wrongdoer simply for committing the wrong is "a principle unworthy of our alle-
giance." Id. at 698. This does not, however, mean abandoning the principles of retri-
bution within the criminal law. As Professor Kadish recognizes, retribution has a deep
and profound influence in our culture. See ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRMI-
NALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 113-14 (1975). Abandoning retri-
bution would be both impractical and profoundly disruptive. Kadish, supra note 286,
at 699-702. Thus even Professor Kadish was unwilling to make revolutionary changes
principles provide similar justification for the felony murder rule.
The best available evidence shows that society considers felony mur-
der to be an extremely serious crime." Its near universal adoption pro-
vides at least circumstantial evidence of the importance we place on pun-
ishing felony murderers." Also, "[tihere is impressive empirical evi-
dence that this classification [felony murder] does indeed reflect widely
shared social attitudes."2" In 1977, the Justice Department conducted a
survey in which respondents were asked to grade the severity of 204
hypothetical events ranging from a terrorist bombing resulting in numer-
ous deaths to truancy by a child under sixteen."5 "Respondents as-
signed widely differing scores to various differences in result, without
reference to mens rea."2 Situations closely resembling rape and rob-
bery felony murder received the second- and third-highest severity scores
in the survey."7 Finally, jury studies also support the notion that the
public agrees with the results in felony murder cases.'O
Public sentiment this strong neither can nor should be ignored. Crimi-
nal law, by providing sanction for public morality, is part of the glue that
holds society together.' For this reason any reform of the criminal law
must take heed of society's strong moral interest in retributive justice,"
and retain felony murder.
Felony murder also serves more than retribution. The doctrine has a
potentially strong deterrent effect."' Most attacks on the deterrence of
the felony murder nile ridicule its purported attempt to deter accidental
killings.2 Yet, very few fel ny-murder killings are truly accidental. As
one of the most ardent critics of the felony murder rule admits, "ITihe
in the criminal law that run counter to deeply held retributive principles. See id. at
701.
292. See THE DATA, supra note 263, at 4.
293. See Crump & Crump, supra note 271, at 362.
294. Id. at 363.
295. See THE DATA, supra note 263, at 4-5.
296. Crump & Crump, supra note 271, at 364.
297. THE DATA, supra note 263, at 4. The rape homicide is described as follows: "A
man forcibly rapes a woman. As a result of physical injuries she dies." Id. The rob-
bery killing is described as "[riobbing a victim at gunpoint. The victim struggles and
is shot to death." Id. The only incident rated higher is "[p~lanting a bomb in a public
building. The bomb explodes and twenty people are killed." Id.
298. See Crump & Crump, supra note 271, at 364-65 (citing H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 443 n.18 (1966)).
299. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. The deterrent effect of felony mur-
der is qualified with "potentially" because of the extreme difficulty of measuring de-
terrence in the criminal law. Id.
302. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 38.
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number of felony murder defendants who are not intentional killers is
unclear but probably not many.""' The most likely felony murderer is
not Justice Holmes' unlucky thief.3' The most likely felony murderer is
the felon who cold-bloodedly kills the only witnesses to his crime."°
The typical response of critics of the felony murder rule is to claim
that intentional, knowing or reckless killings committed in the course of
felonies can be prosecuted as murder without the felony murder rule."
This is wrong. An intentional killing during a robbery or rape is not nec-
essarily "clearly ... subject to prosecution " "°7 as intent to kill murder.
The state can only prosecute if it has the evidence to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the killing was intentional.' Too often, the exact
circumstances behind the killing will be unknown because the defendant
has killed the only witness."° The felony murder rule attempts to deter
this conduct in two ways. First, by dispensing with the mens rea for
murder, it eliminates a significant advantage of killing the witness. Sec-
ond, the felony murder rule significantly increases the risk to the felon
who chooses to kill. While he may be more likely to get away with his
rape or robbery, the felon who kills cannot claim mitigating circumstanc-
es and, charged with first-degree murder, may suffer much more if he is
finally caught.
The felony murder rule attempts to change the calculus of the felon
who can kill the witnesses. There is evidence that serious crimes can be
deterred if the consequences are properly communicated.310 "The felony
303. Rosen, supra note 271, at 1131 (emphasis added); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.2 commentary at 38. "For the vast majority of cases it is probably true that
homicide occurring during the commission or attempted commission of a felony is
murder independent of the felony-murder rule." Id.
304. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
305. See, e.g., People v. Benson, 802 P.2d 330, 337 (Cal. 1990) (noting the
defendant's remark that he killed the two children he molested, their mother, and
their brother in order "'to protect my freedom'"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 924 (1991).
306. See 2 LA FAVE & ScoTT, supra note 124, § 7.5(h), at 232 n.131.
307. Id.
308. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
309. In cases with accomplices there may be another witness, but accomplice tes-
timony brings its own set of considerable problems for the criminal justice system.
See 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2057, at 417 (Chadbourne rev.
1978).
310. Cf VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 291, at 113 ("Deterrence depends on the likeli-
hood and on the regularity of human responses to danger, and not on rationality.").
murder rule is just the sort of simple, commonsense, readily enforceable,
and widely known principle that is likely to result in deterrence."3 '
The case against the felony murder rule is more superficial than most
academics realize. There are strong retributive and deterrent reasons for
retaining the rule. Because it is a clear, easily understood, constitu-
tional" 2 rule that fulfills the twin goals of crime prevention and satisfy-
ing society's sense of justice, 3 ' California's first-degree felony murder
rule should be retained.
B. Redefining Homicide
The most important task of any criminal reform is redefining the
crimes. Crimes drive the criminal law. The primary problem with
California's homicide law is the defition of various criminal homicides.
This section consists of the text of proposed changes to the homicide
laws of California followed by reasons for the changes. Where appropri-
ate, there will be explanations for statutes or terms omitted from the
prior law.
1. Murder
The first change from the Penal Code is the omission of any general
definition of murder such as the one found in Penal Code section 187.
3
'
4
Murder is not one crime. While different mental states, such as express
and implied malice, may be punished the same way, they are not the
same crime."5 Any effort to bind all forms of murder under some cen-
tral theme such as malice aforethought is doomed to failure. Therefore,
the definition of murder will be found where it belongs, in the definition
of the various degrees of murder.
The following would replace Penal Code section 187.
§ 187. Murder
a) Murder consists of two distinct crimes, first-degree murder and sec-
ond-degree murder.
b) First-Degree Murder consists of the killing of a human being or fetus
311. Crump & Crump, supra note 271, at 370-71.
312. See People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 718 (Cal. 1983); cf. Schad v. Arizona, 501
U.S. 624, 645 (1991) (plurality) (stating felony murder can be treated as the equiva-
lent of murder by deliberation); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (noting
that felony murder can justify the death penalty).
313. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
314. "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice
aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988).
315. See infra notes 316-20 and accompanying text.
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1) with the intent to kill, or;
2) in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, tor-
ture, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, or any act
punishable under section 286, 288, 2 88a, or 289.
c) Subdivision (b) provides the sole means of committing first-degree
murder. No other act or mental element is necessary to commit first-
degree murder. Liability for first-degree murder under subdivision (b)(1)
is subject to mitigation, as provided for in section 192, and justification,
as provided for in section 197. Liability for first-degree murder under
subdivision (b)(2) is subject to accident, as provided for in section
187.1.
d) Second-degree murder is the killing of a human being or fetus that
is the result of an act an ordinary prudent person would know to involve
an unreasonable and very high risk of death.
e) Subdivision (d) provides the sole means of committing second-de-
gree murder. No other act or mental element is necessary to commit
second-degree murder. There is no crime of second-degree felony mur-
der. Liability for second-degree murder under subdivision (d) is subject
to justification, as provided for in section 197.
f) This section shall not apply to any person who commits an act which
results in the death of a fetus if any of the following apply:
(1) The act complied with the Therapeutic Abortion Act, Chapter 11
(commencing with Section 25950) of Division 20 of the Health and Safe-
ty Code.
(2) The act was committed by a holder of a physician's and surgeon's
certificate, as defined in the Business and Professions Code, in a case
where, to a medical certainty, the result of childbirth would be death of
the mother of the fetus or where her death from childbirth, although not
medically certain, would be substantially certain or more likely than not.
(3) The act was solicited, aided, abetted, or consented to by the moth-
er of the fetus.
(g) Subdivision (f) shall not be construed to prohibit the prosecution of
any person under any other provision of law.
a. First-degree murder
i. Defining the crime
The most noticeable change from prior law is the elimination of the
premeditation requirement for first-degree murder. As noted earlier, pre-
meditation is not up to the task of classifying murders because premedi-
tation is too difficult to define with any meaningful precision."'
Intent to kill, however, provides a clear and meaningful definition of
first-degree murder. "Intent to kill" is murder stripped down to its most
basic terms, a nearly universal way of defining murder?' 7 Furthermore,
it has the additional advantage of being the current definition of express
malice in California,"8 and thus will lessen the disruption caused by the
reforms. Because it is so straightforward, intent to kill is very difficult
for the courts to manipulate. Unlike malice, which brought about dimin-
ished capacity,3 ' or premeditation, which gave California the three-part
Anderson test,32 the courts have not manipulated intent to kill.
Intent to kill also provides a meaningful distinction from the uninten-
tional murders that will constitute second-degree murder under the pro-
posed reforms. There is no act more serious than killing another person.
It is the one act that cannot be excused by the necessity defense,32' and
its most culpable form, murder, is considered the ultimate crime.3' The
intent to commit this ultimate crime is what makes intentional murder
more culpable than unintentional murder.3' A person can commit unin-
tentional murder although intending to harm no one. 24 While uninten-
316. See supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
317. See, e.g., 2 LA FAVE & SCOTT, supra note 124, § 7.2, at 191; MORELAND, supra
note 7, at 17-19; 3 STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 19.
318. See People v. Saille, 820 P.2d 588, 594 (Cal. 1991).
319. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
320. See People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942, 949 (Cal. 1968).
321. See People v. Petro, 56 P.2d 984, 985 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936); Regina v. Dudly &
Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 287-88 (1884); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 44, at 1058.
322. Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LAW 198 (W. Hastie trans., 1887)
(1796).
[WIhoever has committed Murder, must die . . . .Even if a Civil Society re-
solved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members . . . the last
Murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolution was
carried out. This ought to be done in order that every one may realize the
desert of his deeds ....
ld.; see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598-99 (1977) (plurality) (holding that the death
penalty is unconstitutionally excessive for rape but not for murder)..
323. People v. Eshelman, 275 Cal. Rptr. 810, 816 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). "The inten-
tional killing of another human being is the ultimate expression of violence . . . ." Id.
324. See, e.g., People v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279, 285-86 (driving while intoxicated can
support implied malice); People v. Thomas, 261 P.2d 1, 2, 7 (Traynor, J., concurring)
(Cal. 1953) (finding implied malice when the defendant intended to shoot a coffee
cup out of the victim's hand for sexual gratification, but missed, killing the victim);
People v. Protopappas, 246 Cal. Rptr. 915, 924 n.9 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (finding im-
plied malice for "acts committed as a practicing, licensed dentist under circumstances
where there can be no doubt he did not truly intend to kill anyone"); People v.
Stein, 137 P.2d 271, 274 (Cal. Ct. App. 1913) (stating that firing shots into crowded
room because music was too loud supports implied malice).
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tional murder is a terrible crime, the fact that no killing is intended cre-
ates the appropriate degree of difference between the two crimes.2
The only other major issue raised by intentional murder is how to
define it. The main alternatives to intent to kill are found in the Model
Penal Code, which uses "purposeful" and "knowing" to define intentional
murders.326 While these may be adequate ways to define the most culpa-
ble form of killing, they are not so clearly superior to warrant dispensing
with the familiar and sound "intent to kill."
ii. Felony murder
Although the felony murder rule itself requires some justification,327
there is little to change in California's first-degree felony murder law.
Like most modern felony murder statutes, California's limits first-degree
felony murder to the most serious felonies." Judicial interpretation of
this law is not perfect, but there is no interpretation that requires statu-
tory overruling.
One change in the felony murder law is the omission of mayhem from
the new definition. Mayhem is too close to an assault-based crime to be
within the felony murder rule. Under traditional doctrine, felony murder
cannot be based upon assault or other crimes that are an integral part of
the homicide.2 9 Mayhem, or "unlawfully and maliciously depriv[ing] a
human being of a member of his body, or disabl[ing], disfigur[ing] or ren-
der[ing] it useless,"' is too much an assault-based crime to be included
in the definition of felony murder.
325. It is interesting to note that the examples given by James Stephen of unpre-
meditated murders that are worse than many premeditated murders are still intention-
al, if not premeditated. See 3 STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 94. Two are clearly inten-
tional murders: "deliberately but instantly" slitting the throat of someone who rejects
the defendant's advances, and blowing the brains out of a creditor who just asked
for his money. See id. The third, drowning a small boy by pushing him off a bridge
and into a river, provides at least strong circumstantial evidence of an intent to kill.
See id.; see also supra note 202 and accompanying text. None of the examples is
clearly unintentional murder.
326. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1980).
327. See supra notes 271-313 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
329. See People v. Wilson, 462 P.2d 22, 28 (Cal. 1969) (stating that assault cannot
be the predicate felony for the burglary underlying a felony murder conviction).
330. CAL. PENAL CODE § 203 (West Supp. 1995).
The crime of torture," however, is an assaultive crime that deserves
to be part of the felony murder statute. The intent to inflict pain height-
ens culpability for killings committed through torture, making it worthy
of serious punishment.' Furthermore, the mental element for the crime
of torture, "intent to cause cruel or extreme pain," is essentially the same
as the mental element for the "specific act" first-degree murder by tor-
ture.' The reform simply moves this crime from specific act murder to
felony murder.
The final change to first-degree felony murder, an affirmative defense
of accidental killing, is discussed later.'
iii. Specific act murder
The final change to the definition of first-degree murder is the omis-
sion of all specific methods of killing from first-degree murder except for
murder by torture, which is transferred to felony murder. As noted be-
fore, with the exception of torture, the specific means punished as first-
degree murder were little more than circumstantial proxies for premedi-
tation.' As premeditation has no place in the law of murder, there is
no reason to retain its proxies.
b. Second-degree murder
The reform makes four significant changes in California's second-de-
gree murder law.
i. Definition of risks
The first change is in the definition of the risky behavior that is at the
heart of unintentional murder. Unintentional murder, whether it is called
"depraved heart," "implied malice," or given some other label, centers
331.
Every person who, with the intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffer-
ing for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic
purpose, inflicts great bodily injury as defined in Section 12022.7 upon the
person of another, is guilty of torture.
The crime of torture does not require any proof that the victim suffered pain.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West Supp. 1995).
332. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
333. See People v. Wiley, 554 P.2d 881, 883-84 (Cal. 1976). Murder by torture is an
act with a "high probability of death" committed "with the intent to cause cruel pain
and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion or for any other sa-
distic purpose." Id.
334. See infra notes 465-70 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 147-57 and accompanying text.
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around a very risky act that causes the death of another, even though the
defendant does not intend to kill." Through a series of decisions, the
California Supreme Court has devised the following definition of the risk
necessary for unintentional murder. "an intentional act, the natural con-
sequences of which are dangerous to life." 7
Although this phrase is better than "abandoned and malignant heart," it
is still too wordy and obscure. Unintentional murder addresses risk-creat-
ing behavior. Instead of using the euphemism "natural consequences,"
the proposed definition addresses risk directly. The reform defines the
risk in very general terms because any further specificity would be futile.
Unintentional murders may be committed in an enormous variety of
ways.m As we cannot expect to define such varied conduct with any
great precision,m a general but clear definition of the necessary risk is
the most prudent course. The "very high risk of death" language provides
the proper compromise between clarity and breadth.' °
While it differs from the current California definition of implied malice,
the difference is more a matter of style than substance. While current
law may look to the "natural consequences" of a defendant's conduct, the
ultimate issue is "the [degree of] life threatening risk created by [a
defendant's] conduct." " The proposed definition simply makes this key
issue clearer and more easily understood.
ii. Objective standard
The second change, adopting an objective standard for unintentional
murder, is a much greater break from current law. Several jurisdictions,
including California, and most commentators, require that the defendant
be subjectively aware of the danger of his actions before he may be
found liable for unintentional murder.4 2 The rationale behind the sub-
336. See, e.g., 3 STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 21; MORELAND, supra note 7, at 32; 2 1A
FAvE & Scorr, supra note 124, § 7.4.
337. People v. Dellinger, 783 P.2d 200, 201 (Cal. 1989).
338. See 2 LA FAVE & Scorr, supra note 124, § 7.4.
339. "Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty
from our language." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
340. See DeUinger, 783 P.2d at 201.
341. Id.; see also People v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279, 285 (Cal. 1981) (requiring a stan-
dard of "high probability that [the conduct] will result in death");, People v.
Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965) (same); People v. Thomas, 261 P.2d 1, 7
(Cal. 1953) (same).
342. See, e.g., Watson, 637 P.2d at 283; MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1980); 2 LA
jectivity requirement is that the crime should fit the individual
offender. 3 A second-degree murder conviction following a "depraved
heart" finding is so serious that it should only be imposed on those who
are subjectively aware of the seriousness of their acts." The problem
with this rationale is that it ignores reality. Few people do not truly un-
derstand the consequences of their actions, and many of those who do
not are undeserving of extra defenses to their crimes.
In the overwhelming majority of cases there is little practical differ-
ence between the objective and subjective awareness standards; it will
be only "the unusual case where the defendant is not aware of the
risk." 5 These rare instances involve the unreasonably "absent-minded,
stupid or intoxicated."" The intoxicated are by far the largest group
protected by the subjective standard. Relatively few people are so men-
tally disabled that they cannot appreciate the danger of their acts. 7
Most of those few that meet this standard are too incompetent to be lia-
ble for any crime.' Many people become intoxicated, however, and too
many of these people commit homicides."
The voluntarily intoxicated3 defendant simply does not deserve the
protection afforded by the subjective standard. Intoxication makes
FAVE & SCOTT, supra note 124, § 7; 3 STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 22.
343. See MORELAND, supra note 7, at 36-41 (discussing subjective intent), 196-212
(discussing intentional murder under statutes).
344. See, e.g., 2 LA FAVE & SCOTT, supra note 124, § 7.4.
345. Id.; accord JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 166-67 (2d ed.
1960).
346. 2 LA FAVE & SCOTT, supra note 124, § 7.4.
347. Morse, supra note 223, at 40-41. "Craziness seems to affect impulses, controls,
and motivations for actions, but it does not stop persons from intending to do what
they do or from narrowly knowing factually what they are doing." Id. at 41.
348. See CAL PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1988) (noting that "idiots" are not capable of
committing crimes). In In re Ramon M., the California Supreme Court held that the
A.L.I. test for insanity adopted in People v. Drew also applied to the defense of idio-
cy under Penal Code section 26. In re Ramon M., 584 P.2d 524, 530 (Cal. 1978) (cit-
ing People v. Drew, 583 P.2d 1318, 1326 (Cal. 1978)). Penal Code section 25(b),
adopted as part of Proposition 8, abrogated the A.L.I. test of insanity and replaced it
with the M'Naghten test. See 1 WITKIN & EPSTEIN, supra note 128, §§ 204-205, at 233-
34. Since section 25(b) refers only to "insanity," it is uncertain whether the
M'Naghten test also applies to idiocy claims. See id. § 187, at 216.
349. While voluntary intoxication is a more popular defense, as a practical matter it
is very rare for intoxication to truly negate mens rea- See Morse, supra note 223, at
45-47.
350. Involuntary intoxication is theoretically at least a valid defense if it produces
unconsciousness. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(15) (West 1988); People v. Cruz, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 740, 754 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). This condition is rare to the point of nonexis-
tence with respect to alcohol, and rare with respect to drugs. See 1 WrrxIN & EP-
STEIN, supra note 128, § 216, at 250.
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crimes like unintentional murder more likely to happen."' There is no
reason to reward people for engaging in behavior that makes them more
dangerous. Indeed, the better argument is that those who commit crimes
while intoxicated have all the more reason to be isolated from the pub-
lic.'
The Model Penal Code recognized the problem of the intoxicated of-
fender and did not allow voluntary intoxication to negate reckless mur-
der.' Most jurisdictions follow suit and prohibit intoxication from ne-
gating implied malice.'
The California Supreme Court foreclosed this option in People v. Saille
and People v. Whitfield. In Whitfield, the high court held that implied
malice murder was a specific intent crime and could thus be negated by
voluntary intoxication under California Penal Code section 22.' Al-
though Whitfield turned on statutory interpretation, Saille precludes a
simple statutory answer to Whitfield.
Saille was the California Supreme Court's first major interpretation of
the 1981 reforms that abolished the diminished capacity defense. One
issue in Saille was whether these reforms violated due process by pre-
venting the defendant from mounting a diminished capacity defense."7
The Saille court dismissed this argument, holding that since the abolition
of the diminished capacity defense did not prevent the defendant from
using his intoxication to prove that he did not have the necessary mens
rea, the abolition was constitutional.' This precludes the Model Penal
Code solution. "If, however, a crime requires a particular mental state the
Legislature may not deny a defendant the opportunity to prove he did
not possess that state. " 9
Although the Saille dicta is an incorrect statement of constitutional
law,'s there is no good reason to challenge it by statute. While the Cali-
351. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
352. "As the purpose is to compel men to abstain from dangerous conduct, and not
merely to restrain them from evil inclinations, the law requires them at their peril to
know the teachings of common experience, just as it requires them to know the
law." HOLMES, supra note 7, at 57.
353. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
354. See 2 LA FAVE & ScoTr, supra note 124, § 7.4.
355. See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text
356. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
357. People v. Saille, 820 P.2d 588, 596 (Cal. 1991).
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. The only support the Saille court cites for its dictum, Patterson v. New York,
fornia Supreme Court might reverse itself or the United States Supreme
Court could reverse California's high court,36' there is no reason to ex-
pect this. The California Supreme Court has shown no great willingness
to overturn its past decisions."' In addition, it would be foolish to pre-
dict that the United States Supreme Court would grant certiorari to ad-
dress this particular issue.'
Second-degree murder is too important for constitutional experimenta-
tion. The objective standard is thus necessary to overrule Whitfield while
avoiding the constitutional roadblock established in Saille.3" The
Whitfield court based its finding that implied malice could be negated by
intoxication on the fact that implied malice "requires that the defendant
act with knowledge of the danger to, and in conscious disregard of, hu-
man life." " The objective standard, by eliminating this requirement, re-
moves any mental element that defendant can negate through intoxica-
tion. Since this redefines an element of the crime as opposed to limiting
the defendant's evidence, it will not run afoul of Saille.
iii. The reasonableness requirement
The objective standard brings with it the requirement that the risk to
human life be "unreasonable. " ' This common sense requirement is de-
rived from both the law of negligence that is the basis of the objective
standard, and California's law of implied malice murder. 7 "Unreason-
able" is thus best seen as a bridge between the current, subjective law of
implied malice murder and the objective standard of the reform.
Those homicides where death was unintended, but involved conduct
sufficiently risky to be considered murder, have a variety of labels.
does not support the proposition that a state cannot limit mens rea defenses. See
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977). Patterson concerned ensuring that
the prosecution had to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 215-16.
It wanted to prevent the state from manipulating the elements of a crime in order to
lessen the prosecution's burden of proof. Id. at 210. Preventing the use of intoxica-
tion to lessen a defendant's liability does not lower the prosecution's burden of prov-
ing every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt See People v. Whitfield,
868 P.2d 272, 289-90 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
361. Even if the United States Supreme Court overruled the Saile statement,
California's high court could reimpose the ruling under the California Constitution's
due process provision. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
362. One example of this reluctance is the immortality of the imperfect self-defense
doctrine. See supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.
363. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 3.13 (6th ed. 1986).
364. See supra notes 355-64 and accompanying text.
365. People v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272, 278 (Cal. 1994).
366. See MORELAND, supra note 7, at 36-38.
367. See id.; supra notes 3148 and accompanying text.
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Whether called "implied malice," "depraved heart," "unintentional," or
"reckless," this type of murder is ultimately derived from the principles
of negligence. A fundamental aspect of negligence is that in addition
to creating risk, an act must be "unreasonable" in order to be negli-
gent."3" The reform imports this concept into its definition of negligent
murder.7
In the overwhelming majority of cases, the unreasonableness of the
risk creating conduct is evident. Playing Russian roulette, shooting into a
crowded room, or similarly dangerous conduct is never reasonable. It is
meant for the extremely rare case, such as throwing a small child from a
burning building in order to save the child's life. 7'
The unreasonableness requirement also brings the reform closer to the
"conscious disregard for life" required for implied malice under California
law.7 In the hypothetical above, the person who is reasonably attempt-
ing to save someone from death by exposing the person to very risky
conduct would not be displaying the conscious disregard for life required
under California law. 7' While the unreasonableness requirement retains
this element of mercy from current California. law, the reform is still able
to dispense with the needless and dangerous subjectivity found in cur-
rent law. Unreasonableness thus allows the reform to have the best of
both worlds.
iv. Second-degree felony murder
The final change is found in subdivision (d) which explicitly abrogates
the second-degree felony murder rule. The problem with the second-de-
gree felony murder rule is that unless it is limited to abstractly danger-
ous felonies, it is too broad to serve any useful purpose.74 Any act that
368. See 2 LA FAVE & Scorr, supra note 124, § 7.4; MORELAND, supra note 7, at 13-
16, 31-41.
369. "[Njegligence is conduct which falls below the standard established by law for
the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF ToRTs § 282 (1965).
370. See MORELAND, supra note 7, at 32.
371. This scenario would not be covered by California's definition of justification,
which only covers the use of lethal force against aggressors. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 197 (West 1988).
372. See People v. Dellinger, 783 P.2d 200, 201 (Cal. 1989).
373. See id.
374. See supra notes 123-38 and accompanying text.
passes this stringent test is already unintentional or implied malice mur-
der.3
75
Abolishing second-degree felony murder and retaining first-degree
felony murder are perfectly consistent acts. The felonies that make up
the first-degree felony murder rule, such as rape, kidnapping, robbery,
and burglary, are the types of violent crimes in which there is a strong
incentive to kill the victim.' As deterring these types of killings is the
heart of the felony murder rule, it makes sense to retain California's first-
degree felony murder rule while abolishing the meaningless and redun-
dant crime of second-degree felony murder.
c. Fetal murder
Subdivision (f) and the "killing of a human being or fetus" language in
subdivisions (b) and (d) follows current California law that expands
murder liability to the death of a fetus killed with the requisite mental
state.77 This expansion was in response to Keeler v. Superior Court,
3 78
where the California Supreme Court held that an unborn fetus could not
be the subject of a homicide.7 The legislature amended California Pe-
nal Code section 187 to nullify Keeler, and the proposed statute retains
the same language from section 187.'
The facts of Keeler demonstrate the horror of fetal killings. Keeler and
the mother of the fetus divorced after sixteen years of marriage."l An-
other man impregnated the mother, a fact she concealed from Keeler.'
Keeler later learned of his ex-wife's pregnancy and confronted her about
it when they next met.' During the ensuing argument he stated, "I'm
going to stomp it out of you."' He then struck her face with several
blows and kneed her in the abdomen, killing the fetus.'
This is the type of conduct the fetal inclusion targets.' It is particu-
larly contemptible conduct and deserves severe condemnation. At the
375. See supra notes 123-38 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 301-05 and accompanying text.
377. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988).
378. 470 P.2d 617 (1970).
379. Id. at 630.
380. See 1970 Cal. Stat. 2440 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988).
381. Id. at 618-19.
382. Id. at 618.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. See supra notes 376-80 and accompanying text.
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same time, subdivision (g) ensures that this statute will not interfere with
a woman's constitutional right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. 7
2. Manslaughter
§ 192. Manslaughter
a) Manslaughter consists of two distinct crimes, voluntary manslaughter
and involuntary manslaughter.
b) Voluntary manslaughter is mitigated intent to kill murder. A murder
committed pursuant to section 187, subdivision (b)(1), is mitigated to
voluntary manslaughter if the killing is the product of adequate provoca-
tion. Adequate provocation is defined as any act or acts by the victim
that would cause a reasonable person to lose normal self control. In
order for the killing to be mitigated to voluntary manslaughter, the killer
must actually be provoked by the victim's conduct and be acting under
that provocation during the killing. If there has been sufficient time be-
tween the provocation and the killing for a reasonable person to regain
self-control, then the killing may not be mitigated to voluntary man-
slaughter.
c) Adequate provocation, as defined in subdivision (b), is the sole means
of mitigating murder to voluntary manslaughter. This subdivision is in-
tended to overrule the doctrine of imperfect self-defense but is not limit-
ed to that purpose.
d) Involuntary manslaughter is criminally negligent homicide. Criminally
negligent homicide is the killing of a human being that results from an
act that a reasonable person would know to involve an unreasonable and
high risk of serious injury to another human being.
a. Structure
There are two noteworthy changes from the current structure of man-
slaughter. The first dispenses with the notion that manslaughter is one
general crime, and that its various forms-voluntary, involuntary and
vehicular-are simply subspecies of the same crime.' These are each
very distinct crimes with distinct elements and punishments. A universal
definition of manslaughter, such as Penal Code section 192's
"[mlanslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice,"
387. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
388. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
is inaccurate and confusing. It is better to treat separate crimes sepa-
rately.' °
The final change to manslaughter's structure is the elimination of all
forms of vehicular manslaughter from section 192. The "gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated" found in section 191.5 makes the other
forms of vehicular manslaughter unnecessary historical artifacts.9 '
Since section 192's variations on vehicular manslaughter serve no useful
purpose, they should be eliminated.
b. Voluntary manslaughter
The primary effect of this statute with regard to voluntary manslaugh-
ter is to make statutory what had previously been judicial interpreta-
tion.' Although Penal Code section 192 only addresses "sudden quarrel
or heat of passion," the key component of voluntary manslaughter has
always been provocation.' The law should not be hidden in the re-
ports; where possible it should be made explicit in the statutes. Thus,
provocation should be a part of the definition of voluntary manslaughter.
This reasoning also supports making explicit the requirement that the
defendant actually be provoked. It is a part of the standard definition of
voluntary manslaughter3 and deserves to be included in the Penal
Code defiition. Similarly, the "sufficient time" language simply makes
explicit what has been implicitly recognized. 5
Another change from prior law is the elimination of "sudden quarrel or
heat of passion."' This phrase, adapted from the common-law defini-
389. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
390. There is, however, no need to dispense with the manslaughter classification.
Both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter are well known terms with a lineage
stretching back to the common law. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 191-
94. Furthermore, unlike malice, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary
manslaughter follows the common sense meaning of words. Voluntary manslaughter is
truly voluntary as it is an intentional killing, while the unintentional killing for the
lesser crime really is involuntary. There is thus little to be gained and much to be
lost by switching to more "modem" classifications such as "second degree intentional
homicide" and "second degree reckless homicide." See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.05,
940.06 (West Supp. 1994).
391. See supra notes 252-70 and accompanying text
392. See CAL PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); People v. Watson, 637
P.2d 279 (Cal. 1981).
393. See 1 WrrKIN & EPSTEIN, supra note 128, § 512; People v. Valentine, 169 P.2d
1, 11 (Cal. 1946).
394. See, e.g., People v. Golsh, 219 P. 456, 459 (Cal. Ct. App. 1923); 2 LA FAvE &
SCOTT, supra note 124, § 7.10(c).
395. See, e.g., People v. Daniels, 802 P.2d 906, 932 (Cal. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 846 (1991).
396. See CAL PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
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tion of voluntary manslaughter,397 tells both too little and too much. It
tells too little because it neglects to include the key component of volun-
tary manslaughter, provocation. "Sudden quarrel" is simply one form of
provocation and "heat of passion" does no more than indicate the mental
state the provocation must produce.
A further problem with "heat of passion" is that it is both over- and
underinclusive in defining what emotions will satisfy voluntary man-
slaughter. "Passion" is capable of being misconstrued as only pertaining
to romantic emotions,s while any powerful emotion other than ven-
geance can satisfy this requirement.' Furthermore, "passion" is suffi-
ciently vague as to leave the jury or the courts with too much room for
interpretation.
It is true that one finds such phrases as "dangerous weapon," "unlawful act," "heat
of passion," "excessive force," and "act malum in se" running through the cases.
But these are used as handles upon which to hang cases rather than as solving
devices. The fact is that like "malice aforethought" they mean little or nothing, if
taken literally. Worse than that, if taken generally, they mean almost anything the
jury wants them to mean.'"
Thus, "heat of passion" is replaced with the more explicit "lose normal
self-control.""' Its chief advantage is to focus the inquiry on the most
important aspect of the "passion" requirement. In order to mitigate a
killing to voluntary manslaughter, it is not enough that the killing be
motivated by great emotion. What is necessary is that the emotion would
cause a reasonable person to lose self-control."2 It is thus appropriate
to focus the statute on this key component of voluntary manslaughter.
397. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 191.
398. See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1323 (3d ed. 1992) (defining passion
first as "a powerful emotion such as love, joy, hatred or anger" while the second def-
inition defines it as a. "[airdent love. b. strong sexual desire, lust. c. The object of
such love or desire.").
399. See People v. Logan, 164 P. 1121, 1122-23 (Cal. 1917)..
400. MORELAND, supra note 7, at 62.
401. 2 LA FAVE & SCOTT, supra note 124, § 7.10(a). Similar phrasing is found else-
where. See, e.g., People v. Golsh, 219 P. 456, 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 1923); MORELAND,
supra note 7, at 309 (providing a model Criminal Homicide Act that defines voluntary
manslaughter as an act "committed in sudden heat of passion' inmediately caused by
a provocation sufficient to deprive a reasonable man of his self-control and power of
cool reflection"); 3 STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 81 (citing DRAFT CODE OF THE CRIMINAL
CODE COMMISSION § 176 (1879)).
402. See, e.g., People v. Brubaker, 346 P.2d 8, 12 (Cal. 1959), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
824 (1961); People v. Bridgehouse, 303 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Cal. 1956).
The final change to voluntary manslaughter is the explicit limitation of
voluntary manslaughter to provocation. The courts have made much
mischief because no such explicit limit exists. While the legislature has
overruled the chief form of mischief, diminished capacity,4" another
problem-the imperfect self-defense doctrine-remains.4 " Subdivision
(c) of the proposed statute rectifies this problem and prevents further
outbreaks of similar judicial innovation.
The most compelling argument against the imperfect self-defense
doctrine4 °. is that it injects a subjective element into an otherwise ob-
jective part of the law. Traditionally, the objective reasonable person
standard has governed voluntary manslaughter."u At first glance, an ob-
jective standard of provocation appears contradictory. After all, no "rea-
sonable" person kills simply because of provocation. 7 This critique
fails to grasp the more subtle purpose served by voluntary manslaughter.
This crime is a recognition that there are times when even reasonable
people can be provoked to the point of losing self-control; once out of
control it is very difficult to be reasonable."8
Voluntary manslaughter thus effects a delicate compromise. It recog-
nizes that people can be provoked to killing, but also recognizes that the
403. See supra note 48.
404. See supra notes 77-96 and accompanying text.
405. There are two distinct imperfect self-defense doctrines. The older variant deals
with a combat initiated by defendant that escalates to the point that the aggressor
must use fatal force to save his own life. See, e.g., PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 44,
at 1138; 2 LA FAVE & Scor, supra note 124, § 7.11; People v. Deason, 384 N.W.2d
72, 74 (Mich. App. 1985); State v. Partlow, 4 S.W. 14, 20 (Mo. 1886); Reed v. State,
11 Tex. Crim. 509, 517-18, (Tex. Crim. App. 1882). The other form of imperfect self-
defense is the one announced in Flannel, an honest but unreasonable belief by the
accused that his life is in danger. See People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1979). As
the former does not exist in California, all references to imperfect self-defense are to
the Flannel variety. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 197(3) (West 1988); People v. Holt, 153
P.2d 21, 25 (Cal. 1944) (stating that self-defense does not apply to the aggressor un-
less he made a good faith effort to break off the combat before committing the ho-
micide).
406. See 2 LA FAVE & Scorr, supra note 124, § 7.10(b).
407. See Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-
Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect SeVf-Defense, 33 UCLA L REv. 1679, 1687 n.49
(1986).
408.
The law [mitigates murder to voluntary manslaughter] because, while it is be-
lieved that all men should do as a reasonable man would do under any and
all circumstances, it is also recognized that human nature is frail, often,
when strongly provoked, failing to measure up to the standard of the reason-
able man.
MORELAND, supra note 7, at 68.
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killing is unreasonable. This doctrine splits the difference, making the
killing mitigated rather than excused.4n
Injecting subjective standards into the law of voluntary manslaughter
upsets this balance. As the objective standard protects the reasonable
person, the only effect of a subjective standard would be to protect the
unreasonable person. Thus, one who is more likely to kill upon less prov-
ocation will be protected by any truly subjective standard. This is similar
to the problem raised by the intoxicated offender. Intoxication makes
one more disposed to commit certain crimes." It makes no sense to re-
ward someone for engaging in behavior that makes him more likely to
commit his crime."' It is equally foolish to reward a person with a
greater disposition to kill by providing him with a subjective standard of
voluntary manslaughter; this is the person from whom society is in great-
est need of protection."2 The standard of provocation should be objec-
tive.
Some defenders of the imperfect self-defense doctrine argue that it
neither rewards unreasonableness nor encourages the killings because it
still punishes the killer for voluntary manslaughter.' This ignores the
considerable benefit derived from a mitigation of murder to manslaugh-
ter. The penalty for murder ranges from fifteen years to life for second-
degree murder, twenty-five years to life for first-degree murder, and life
without possibility of parole or the death penalty for special circumstanc-
409. See id.
410. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
412. Cf. HOLMES, supra note 7, at 108.
[W]hen men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of indi-
vidual peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general
welfare. If, for instance, a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having
accidents and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital de-
fects will be allowed for in the courts of Heaven, but his slips are no less
troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang from guilty neglect. His
neighbors accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to come up to their
standard, and the courts which they establish decline to take his personal
equation into account
Id. While Justice Holmes made this statement during a lecture on tort liability, he be-
lieved that the general principles of civil and criminal liability were the same. Id. at
44. Thus, in this criminal lecture, Holmes referred to his tort lecture for a discussion
on the appropriate reasonable person standard. Id. at 51.
413. See, e.g., Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man
Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 Loy. LA. L REv.
435, 449 (1981).
es first-degree murder. 14 By contrast, the punishment for voluntary
manslaughter is three, six, or eleven years."' This considerable differ-
ence should not turn on the defendant's aggravated sense of personal
safety.
More importantly, the public appreciates the gulf between murder and
voluntary manslaughter. In the Dan White case, it was not an acquittal
but a voluntary manslaughter verdict induced by the diminished capacity
defense that brought about the subsequent riots." A more recent exam-
ple of public outrage is the prosecution of Lyle and Erik Menendez, in
which the juries deadlocked between murder and voluntary manslaughter
despite apparently strong evidence that the brothers killed their parents
with considerable premeditation."' That some of the jury accepted this
defense provoked widespread public criticism."'
Fortunately, these types of cases may only be rare aberrations.419 But
even if they are infrequent, these verdicts are inevitable under a subjec-
tive standard. Subjectivity invites juries to ignore the abnormality of a
defendant's decision to kill and to sympathize with whatever makes a
defendant different from the objective reasonable person, thus creating a
"social reality" of the crime. 2 When jurors accept such an argument,
they accept what is by definition unacceptable to society. Outrage will
follow, as does the anecdotal evidence that "you can get away with mur-
der," which further weakens the cohesiveness of society.2
414. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
415. Id. § 193(a) (West 1988).
416. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
417. See Alan Abrahamson, Lyle Menendez Case Ends in a Mistrial; D.A. to Retry
Brothers, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1994, at Al. The primary defense of both Erik and Lyle
Menendez was that years of purported abuse by their parents made the brothers fear
for their lives. Id. at A27. The prosecution sought first-degree murder convictions for
both brothers, who were tried with separate juries. Both juries were hung, with some
members voting for first-degree murder and the remainder holding out for manslaugh-
ter. Id. at Al, A26.
418. See, e.g., Stephanie B. Goldberg, Fault Lines, 80 A.B.A. J. 40, 41 (1994).
419. See id. at 42.
420. See Donovan & Wildman, supra note 413, at 466-67.
421. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. Traditional voluntary manslaughter
does not cause similar outrage. None of the recent public controversies over exces-
sively lenient verdicts has involved traditional provocation based manslaughter. See
GOLDBERG, supra note 418, at 40-44. Instead, they have revolved around portraying
the killing as a result of the decedent's prior abuse or of other stressful events in
the defendant's past Id. The common-law forms of provocation do not appear to
push the same buttons with the public. This may be due to the fact that they are
ingrained in Western culture. Thus, the types of provocation that will justify voluntary
manslaughter or similarly mitigated homicide are remarkably similar throughout very
different western legal systems. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW
322-24 (1978). In any event, imperfect self-defense and traditional provocation do
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The social rationale for imperfect self-defense is particularly perni-
cious. It asks the jury not to measure the defendant by a standard set by
society for everyone, but instead to pigeonhole the defendant along ra-
cial, gender, social and economic lines,422 and thus to render verdicts on
improper grounds.423 The last thing society needs is more fragmenta-
tion.424 Justice Holmes was right-society must set objective standards
in order to protect itself.42 For that reason, Flannel must go.
c. Involuntary manslaughter
Historically, involuntary manslaughter has been surprisingly difficult to
define. It is typically classified as a homicide resulting from criminal
negligence. 26 Although "negligence" is perhaps the most thoroughly ana-
lyzed term in the law, the bulk of the progress has been in defining civil
negligence; there has been little success in defining criminal negli-
gence."'
appear to be different in the public eye.
422.
The social reality is that each human being is a unique individual, with that
uniqueness derived from socially differentiating factors as sex, race, national
origin, religion, class background and total life experience ....
... By emphasizing individual responsibility in the abstract form, the rea-
sonable man standard leads to unjust consequences, for the standard ignores
the social reality of the individual which has significantly contributed to the
alienation and violence which she or he has acted out.
Donovan & Wildman, supra note 413, at 465.
423. Cf. Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 911-15 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating Supreme Court precedent requiring virtually unlimited consideration of miti-
gating evidence in order to get an "individualized" view of defendant in capital sen-
tencing process increases the chance of racial discrimination in death sentences).
424. This danger is seen in the Erik Menendez case, where the jury split largely on
gender lines. Abrahamson, supra note 417, at A26.
425. See HOLMES, supra note 7, at 49-51.
426. See 2 LA FAVE & Scowt, supra note 124, § 7.12; 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 168 (14th ed. 1979); People v. Penny, 285 P.2d 926, 937
(Cal. 1955). The other form of involuntary manslaughter, "unlawful act" manslaughter,
serves no useful purpose and is thus excised from the reformed definition of invol-
untary manslaughter. See 2 LA FAvE & ScoTr, supra note 124, § 7.13; supra notes 66-
73 and accompanying text.
427. MORELAND, supra note 7, at 119-20. Although published more than 40 years
ago, Moreland's work contains perhaps the most thorough and insightful analysis of
involuntary manslaughter to date.
The problem is that criminal negligence must be a compromise. It
must set a sufficiently high standard to distinguish itself from ordinary
civil negligence,428 but not so high a standard as to conflict with unin-
tentional or "depraved heart" murder. This problem is further complicat-
ed by the fact that negligence encompasses an astonishing variety of pat-
terns.29 It is thus easy to understand why one of the most respected le-
gal minds despaired over ever devising an adequate definition of negli-
gent manslaughter."n
California's current statutory definition of negligent manslaughter as
"the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlaw-
ful manner, or without due caution and circumspection""' is "hardly
illuminating"432 and should be discarded. Most other jurisdictions are
little better, relying on adjectives such as "reckless,"4" "unlawful or
wanton,"4 1 or "grossly negligent." "4 Adjectives alone will not solve the
problem.' Something more specific is in order.
428. Some jurisdictions have held that ordinary civil negligence is enough for invol-
untary manslaughter. See 2 LA FAVE & ScowT, supra note 124, § 7.12(a) at 277 n.7.
An overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have rejected this because ordinary civil
negligence lacked the culpability necessary to justify the harsh consequences of in-
voluntary manslaughter and juries were unwilling to convict fellow citizens for such
truly accidental killings. See MORELAND, supra note 7, at 112-14.
429. MORELAND, supra note 7, at 118-19.
Possible combinations of all these circumstances, objective and subjective, are
literally infinite. One only has to unleash his imagination for a moment to
see a host of old men with rheumatism trying to cross crowded thorough-
fares, drunken drivers speeding defective automobiles through throngs of
indifferent children, inexperienced youngsters recklessly burning leaves on lots
located in populous communities, and so on ad infinitum.
Id.
430. See 3 STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 11.
In order that homicide by omission may be criminal, the omission must
amount to what is sometimes called gross, and sometimes culpable negli-
gence. There must be more, but no one can say how much more, careless-
ness than is required in order to create a civil liability. For instance, many
railway accidents are caused by a momentary forgetfulness or want of pres-
ence of mind, which are sufficient to involve the railway in civil liability, but
are not sufficient to make the railway servant guilty of manslaughter if death
is caused. No rule exists in such cases. It is a matter of degree determined
by the view the jury happen to take in each particular case.
Id.
431. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(b) (West 1988).
432. 1 WrTKIN & EPSTEIN, supra note 128, § 522.
433. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.06 (West Supp. 1994); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1980).
434. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3404 (1988).
435. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2504 (1995).
436. See MORELAND, supra note 7, at 122.
They are not used in their dictionary sense, often far from it, but as 'vague
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The Model Penal Code's definition is unacceptable because even
though it gives an adequate definition of "reckless,"43 it is too subjec-
tive to be used for involuntary manslaughter. The case for objective men-
tal elements in the law of homicide has been made earlierrs and need
not be repeated here. If objective standards are used in the more serious
crimes of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, it is only
logical to apply the reasonable person standard to the lesser crime of
involuntary manslaughter. As in second-degree murder, this negligence-
based crime brings with it an unreasonableness requirement."
Current California law is little better. The courts operate under the illu-
sion that the primary difference between implied malice and involuntary
manslaughter is the subjective standard of the former and the objective
standard of the latter." This simply cannot be. It ignores the fact that
in most cases the perpetrator will subjectively know what a reasonable
person would know." Except for intoxicated or slow-witted perpetra-
tors,"2 the subjective-objective split is a distinction without a differ-
ence. The reports are full of involuntary manslaughter cases in which
there must have been a subjective appreciation of the risk." A better
way to differentiate between unintentional murder and negligent man-
slaughter is the inherent risk of the conduct that caused the death.'
adjectives,' straws flung to jurors drowning in a sea of uncertainty by judges
floundering in like waters. Formless, without substance, they offer small re-
lief.
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting James W.C. Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at
Common Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 31, 38 (1936)).
437. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1980) (defining reckless as consciously disre-
garding a substantial and unjustifiable risk).
438. See supra notes 342-65, 405-08 and accompanying text.
439. See People v. Brogna, 248 Cal. Rptr. 761, 765 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
440. See People v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279, 283 (Cal. 1981).
441. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
442. See supra notes 345-49 and accompanying text.
443. See, e.g., People v. Berry, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 416, 418 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding in-
voluntary manslaughter when a pitbull that defendant trained for dog fighting and
knew to be "vicious and dangerous" killed a small child); People v. Oliver, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 138, 140-41 (Ct. App. 1989) (convicting the defendant for first providing a spoon
to a heavily intoxicated man so that he could take heroin and then not summoning
help when the man collapsed after injecting the heroin); People v. Tophia, 334 P.2d
133, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (finding defendant guilty for hitting a person over the
head with a loaded gun, which discharged and killed a bystander).
444. See 2 LA FAVE & ScoTr, supra note 124, § 7.4; Watson, 637 P.2d at 283 (recog-
nizing some difference in the degree of risk necessary for involuntary manslaughter
and implied malice murder).
The proposed definition of involuntary manslaughter provides a nice
compromise between second-degree murder and civil negligence. "High
risk of serious injury" is unquestionably a lower standard than "very high
risk of killing," while at the same time providing a clearly higher stan-
dard than that of civil negligence."5 The decision to include risk of seri-
ous bodily injury is consistent with the law of California and other juris-
dictions." ' Finally, it provides a clear and concise definition of criminal
negligence using commonly understood terms. It is a marked improve-
ment over current California law.
3. Gross Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated
§ 191.5. Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated
a) Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the killing of a
human being with gross negligence while driving a vehicle in violation of
vehicle code sections 23152 or 23153 or Harbors and Navigation Code
Section 655, subdivisions (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f).
b) Gross negligence is the commission of an act that a reasonable per-
son would know to involve an unreasonable and high risk of serious inju-
ry to another person.
c) Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison for 4, 6, or 10 years.
d) Nothing in this section is intended to prohibit a charge of second-
degree murder when the killing was committed by an intoxicated driver
of a vehicle or vessel.
This crime is one of the rare exceptions to the general rule that the
law should not single out for extra punishment particular ways of com-
mitting homicide. As noted earlier, driving while intoxicated causes many
homicides and warrants deterrence through increased punishment."7
The proposed statute follows the same basic pattern of current Califor-
nia law defining gross negligence as the same type of negligence required
by involuntary manslaughter."8 The lawful-unlawful act distinction is
445. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) ("[Nlegligence is con-
duct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk of harm.").
446. See People v. Penny, 285 P.2d 926, 936 (Cal. 1955); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-3
(1992); IOWA CODE § 707.5 (1993); State v. Beilke, 127 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Minn. 1964).
447. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
448. Compare Penny, 285 P.2d at 937 (stating that involuntary manslaughter requires
a level of negligence incompatible with a proper regard for human life) with People
v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279, 283 (Cal. 1981) (finding that gross negligence is satisfied by
showing indifference to consequences).
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eliminated for the same reasons that misdemeanor and unlawful act
manslaughter were eliminated from involuntary manslaughter."9
Subdivision (d) is meant to avoid an implicit overruling of People v.
Watson, in which the California Supreme Court held that drunk driving
can support a finding of implied malice second-degree murder."° An im-
portant issue in Watson was whether vehicular manslaughter prevented a
second-degree murder finding when the killing was committed by a
drunk driver. 5' Under California law, if each element of a general crimi-
nal statute corresponds to an element of a more specific statute, or if a
violation of the specific statute will commonly result in the violation of
the general statute, then the specific statute preempts the more general
one.452 The defense in Watson argued that since vehicular manslaughter
proscribed killings in the course of driving, this preempted second-degree
murder when driving was involved.4"
The Watson court dismissed this claim, finding that vehicular man-
slaughter and implied malice had distinct mental elements." They each
predicated liability upon awareness of the risk of death." Since implied
malice required a slightly higher, subjective awareness of risk than did
the objective standard of vehicular manslaughter, the two crimes did not
overlap.4
Under the proposed reform, second-degree murder now has an objec-
tive mental element.457 Since the subjectivity of second-degree murder
was the main reason for distinguishing gross negligence from second-
degree murder,4" an argument could be made that section 191.5 could
preclude second-degree murder prosecutions of drunk drivers who kill.
This argument should not be persuasive. The difference between gross
negligence and second-degree murder is greater under the proposed
reforms than it is under present California law.4" Yet it is a plausible ar-
gument and for that reason should be precluded by legislation.
449. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
450. Watson, 637 P.2d at 285.
451. Id. at 282.
452. See People v. Nichols, 620 P.2d 587, 592 (Cal. 1980).
453. Watson, 637 P.2d at 282.
454. Id. at 283.
455. Id.
456. See id.
457. See supra notes 342-65 and accompanying text
458. Watson, 637 P.2d at 283.
459. See supra notes 435-40 and accompanying text.
The removal of implied malice from second-degree murder would not
preclude Watson-type liability for drunk driving homicides. Under Wat-
son, second-degree murder liability is based on the fact that at times
drunk driving can be very dangerous to human life.4" Because the pro-
posal expands second-degree murder liability by adopting an objective
standard, there is no reason to believe that the elimination of implied
malice would mean the death of Watson.
Watson has focused on the fact that relatively few drunk driving inci-
dents lead to fatalities, making Watson appear to be a species of murder
by accident.46 ' This critique fails to take into account that Watson lia-
bility is limited to the most egregious drunk driving homicides.62 As the
Watson court noted, drunk driving is not implied malice per se; it is no
more than a way of supporting a second-degree murder conviction if the
surrounding facts demonstrate the proper level of culpability." Thus
the relatively small number of reported drunk driving murder cases usu-
ally involve extremely aggravated cases of intoxicated driving." Subdi-
vision (d) allows the state to prosecute these most culpable drunk driv-
ing homicides as murder.
C. Other Reforms
Reforming the law of homicide is more than simply redefining the
crimes. This section identifies and proposes needed reforms for other
areas of the law of homicide.
460. Watson, 637 P.2d at 285-86.
461. See id., at 286 (Bird, C. J., dissenting); Jeffery W. Grass, Drunk Driving Mur-
der and People v. Watson: Can Malice Be Implied, 14 S.W.U. L REv. 477, 519 (1984).
462. See Watson, 637 P.2d at 282 (noting that the defendant "exhibited wantonness
and conscious disregard for life"); see also People v. Brogna, 248 Cal. Rptr. 761, 765
(Ct App. 1988) (discussing Watson).
463. See Watson, 637 P.2d at 286.
464. See, e.g., People v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272, 273 (Cal. 1994) (stating that the de-
fendant had three prior drunk driving convictions, was three-quarters over the double
yellow line when he hit the victim head-on, and had a blood alcohol level of .24 two
hours after the accident); People v. Ricardi, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 365-66 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992) (stating that the defendant, who, had a blood alcohol level of .17, six
prior drunk driving convictions, twice participated in outpatient programs that
stressed the danger of drunk driving, and the defendant's pickup crossed the median
and hit the victim's car head-on, having made no attempt to avoid the victim); People
v. Murray, 275 Cal. Rptr. 498, 500-01 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that the defendant,
who had been convicted twice for drunk driving and once for reckless driving, had a
blood alcohol level between .18 and .23, made a U-turn on the freeway, drove east-
bound in the westbound lanes at speeds of 55 to 80 miles an hour, and hit one car
on its side before colliding head-on with another, killing all four passengers).
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1. Defenses
a. Accident defense to felony murder
187.1. Accident defense to felony murder.
a) It is a complete defense to liability for felony murder under Penal
Code section 187, subdivision (b)(2), if defendant proves by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the killing was accidental.
b) For the purposes of this section, a killing is accidental if none of the
principals to the underlying felony intended to kill or cause great bodily
injury.
c) This defense does not preclude liability under any theory of crimi-
nal homicide other than for felony murder.
d) The existence of this defense is not severable from the burden of its
proof being placed on defendant. If placing this burden on defendant is
found to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid then the defense shall
be abrogated.
The main academic criticism of the felony murder rule is that it allows
culpability for truly accidental killings simply because they occurred
during the commission of a felony.46 Although this fear is over-
stated,4" this defense will work justice in those rare cases of truly acci-
dental killings that are prosecuted as felony murders.
Like other affirmative defenses, the burden of proving this defense is
placed on the defendant.467 This placement is crucial. A major reason
behind the felony murder rule is that it is very difficult to prove intent to
kill in felony murders, because the defendant has killed the only witness
to the crime." The felony murder rule, by eliminating the need to
prove intent to kill, deals with this problem by deterring felons from
killing witnesses.4"
465. See supra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
466. See supra notes 301-05 and accompanying text.
467. See, e.g., People v. Drew, 583 P.2d 318, 1326 (Cal. 1978) (involving insanity);
People v. Moran, 463 P.2d 763, 765 (Cal. 1970) (involving entrapment). For some de-
fenses where the defendant has the burden of proof, he only has to raise a reason-
able doubt as to his guilt. See, e.g., People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1346-47 (Cal.
1975) (involving consent to rape or kidnapping).
468. See People v. Walker, 765 P.2d 70, 86 (Cal. 1988); State v. Robbins, 356 S.E.2d
279, 303 (N.C. 1987) ("It is a fact that one of the reasons for the enactment of the
felony murder rule is that often criminals do kill potential witnesses in the course of
the commission of a felony.")
469. See supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text.
Requiring the prosecution to prove that the killing was not accidental
would thus subvert the felony murder doctrine. This also explains subdi-
vision (d) of the proposed statute. Subdivision (d) is a poison pill, abro-
gating the defense if the burden of proof is ever shifted to the prosecu-
tion. While it is very unlikely that placing this burden on the defense will
be declared unconstitutional,7 ' nothing is certain in constitutional law.
Subdivision (d) is an insurance policy against constitutional uncertainty.
b. Excuse
This is no reason to retain the doctrine of excuse. The current defini-
tion of excuse reads as follows:
Homicide is excusable in the following cases:
1. When committed by accident and misfortune, or in doing any other lawful act
by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution, and without any unlawful in-
tent.
2. When committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon any
sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, when no undue
advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used, and when the killing is not
done in a cruel or unusual manner."'
The latter portion of part 1 is redundant. A lawful act committed with
ordinary caution that kills is an accident.
Part 2 is similarly unnecessary. The first portion simply specifies an-
other form of accidental homicide and is thus redundant. The "sudden
combat" portion was probably designed to deal with the fact that a kill-
ing during an assault or battery was involuntary manslaughter under the
misdemeanor manslaughter rule. 72 Part 2 provides a way to excuse tru-
ly accidental killings that arose from relatively minor fights. Since the
proposed reforms eliminate misdemeanor manslaughter, 73 there is no
reason to keep this defense.
"Accident," the remaining part of excuse, is also unnecessary. A truly
accidental killing is at most civilly negligent and thus beyond the reach
of criminal sanction under the proposed reform. A finding of accident is
simply a failure of proof that the conduct was risky enough to constitute
involuntary manslaughter or second degree murder. It is simply illogical
to make a failure of proof a defense.
470. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205-07 (1977) (holding that placing
the burden of proving affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance on defen-
dant does not violate due process); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798-99 (1952)
(holding that placing burden of proving insanity on the defendant does not violate
due process).
471. CAL. PENAL CODE § 195 (West 1988).
472. See 1 WITEIN & EPSTEIN, supra note 128, at § 519.
473. See supra notes 141-45.
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Excuse is derived from the ancient common law, when all homicides
were illegal except for those the king deigned to excuse on a case-by-
case basis.74 Excuse is now no more than a historical artifact and de-
serves to be discarded as the useless clutter that it is.
2. Consistent Language
The terms "malice aforethought" and "premeditation" are not limited to
the statutes defining murder and manslaughter. Since these phrases have
no legal significance under the reformed homicide law, for the sake of
consistency, the terms "malice aforethought" and "premeditation" should
be stricken from the Penal Code. Those statutes that contain either
phrase are California Penal Code sections 22, 25, 28, 29, 664 and 4500. '
Eliminating these phrases from those statutes is a matter of editing and
does not warrant further analysis.
3. Burden of Going Forward
§ 189.5. Murder-Burden of Going Forward: Mitigation, Justification,
or Excuse
a) In a prosecution for murder under Section 187, the defense has the
burden of going forward for any claim that the killing is mitigated or
justified.
b) Once the defense submits to the trier of fact evidence of a claim of
mitigation or justification, the burden is satisfied and the prosecution
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the nonexistence of the relevant
claim.
c) Nothing in this section shall apply to or affect any proceeding under
Section 190.3 or 190.4.
This clarifies and improves current California law on burdens as they
relate to homicide defenses. The current section 189.5 refers to placing
the burden of proving justification, excuse, or mitigation on the de-
fense.47 As interpreted by California courts, it is actually a burden of
474. See MORELAND, supra note 7, at 256.
475. See CAL PENAL CODE §§ 22, 25, 28, 29, 664, 4500 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
476. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189.5 (West Supp. 1995).
(a) Upon a trial for murder, the commission of the homicide by the defen-
dant being proved, the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation, or that
justify or excuse it, devolves upon the defendant, unless the proof on the
part of the prosecution tends to show that the crime committed only
going forward that is met by evidence that raises a reasonable doubt of
guilt." The reform makes clear that this is only a burden of going for-
ward. The only significant change is replacing the "raise a reasonable
doubt of guilt" standard for discharging the burden with an "evidence to
support a claim" standard. The reasonable doubt standard reflects the
fact that a lack of mitigation, excuse, or justification is an element of
murder under current California law."7 Since lack of mitigation, excuse,
or justification is not an element of murder under the proposed reforms,
the reasonable doubt requirement should be eliminated. The evidence
supporting a claim standard simply reflects current law on satisfying the
burden of going forward."7
D. Summary
As this Article demonstrates, reforming the law of homicide is a large
and complex task. Many statutes have to be amended, and others will be
abandoned completely. For the sake of convenience, the following list
summarizes the statutes to be changed by the proposed reform. Penal
Code section 187 (definition of murder) will be deleted and replaced
with the new definition of first- and second-degree murder. Section 189.5
(burden of proving mitigation, justification, or excuse) is modified. Sec-
tions 188 (express and implied malice), 191.5 (gross vehicular manslaugh-
ter while intoxicated), 192 (manslaughter), 193 (punishment for man-
slaughter), 199 (acquittal after justification or excuse), 22 (voluntary
intoxication), 25 (diminished capacity), 28 (mental disease, defect, or
disorder), 664 (attempt), and 4500 (assault by a life prisoner) will be
amended but retain some of their original form. Sections 188 (express
and implied malice), 189 (degrees of murder), 192.5 (vehicular man-
slaughter involving a vessel), 193.5 (punishment for vehicular manslaugh-
ter involving a vessel), and 195 (excuse) are abolished.
The rest of the law of homicide is unchanged. This includes numerous
sentencing provisions4" and other miscellaneous provisions. s'
amounts to manslaughter, or that the defendant was justifiable or excusable.
(b) Nothing in this section shall apply to or affect any proceeding under Sec-
tion 190.3 or 190.4.
Id.
477. See People v. Frye, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217, 220-21 (Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting
burden under California Penal Code section 189.5).
478. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
479. See CAL EVID. CODE § 604 (West 1966).
480. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190, 190.05, 190.1, 190.2, 190.25, 190.3, 190.4, 190.5, 190.6,
and 190.9 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
481. Id. §§ 191 (discussing abolition of petit treason), and 194 (laying out three
year and a day rule) (West 1988).
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IV. CONCLUSION
If war is too important to be left to the military,' then the law of ho-
micide is too important to be left to the courts. The jumble of poorly
worded and archaic statutes that make up California's homicide law
cedes control of the law to the courts that interpret it. While the courts
may have meant well in fashioning the law of homicide, it is not their job
to do so. Defining criminal conduct is a legislative task. By creating a law
of homicide that is much less in need of creative interpretation, this
reform would return the law of homicide to the people and their elected
representatives. The law of homicide is simply too important to be left
anywhere else.
482. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMiLLkR QUOTATIONS 401 (Enily Morison Beck ed., 15th ed.
1980) (quoting Charles Tallyrand).

